

SDSC NEWSLETTER

STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE
RESEARCH SCHOOL OF PACIFIC AND ASIAN STUDIES • THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

JANUARY 2004 • ISSN 1327 4139

THE OUTLOOK FOR SDSC IN 2004: Some Thoughts from the Head



As the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre has embarked on some new directions in recent months, let me take this opportunity to share my sense of what is in store for 2004. Overall, the opportunities are substantial and the outlook is bright.

I am delighted to advise an important development in the corporate governance of the Centre with the recent first meeting of the new SDSC Advisory Council. Primary roles of the Advisory Council are to serve as a 'sounding board' for the Centre's Head, to provide advice on longer term development issues and to help marshal external support for the Centre. I am grateful that the following distinguished individuals have agreed to serve with me as members of the Advisory Council: Professor Paul Dibb (Chair), General John Baker, Professor Desmond Ball, Dr Coral Bell, Air Marshal Ray Funnell, Mr Stephen Loosely, Mr Andrew Robb and Vice Admiral Robert Walls. The Advisory Council is well-placed to play an important role in the development of the Centre in coming years and I encourage all friends of the Centre to give Council members their full support.

A key priority for the Centre in 2004 will be a further strengthening of our research and publication programs. While we wish Dr Alan Dupont well as he departs for the Lowy Institute in Sydney, we expect shortly to welcome two new academic members to the staff. First will be a new Coordinator for the Asian Security Research Program and a second will be a Deputy Director of Studies to work with Dr Robert Ayson in the highly successful Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence Program. There are good prospects for creating a further new academic position in the Centre late in the New Year.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

	Page
The Wise Owls' Club	3
GSSD Program Launch in Tokyo	4
United Nations endorsement	4
Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence: Bigger and Better	5
The Boeing Library	5
Australian Defence Transformation Project	6
Visitor to the SDSC: Professor Reddy (<i>photo</i>)	6
Undergraduate Program	7
Staff Profile: Jo Higgins	7
Recent SDSC Publications	8
SDSC Publications Ordering Information	11
Show Me the WMD! Searching for Biological Weapons in Iraq ■ <i>Christian Enemark</i>	12
Living with a Wounded Superpower ■ <i>Coral Bell</i>	14
What ASIO Needs: Better Resources, Not More Powers ■ <i>Christopher Michaelsen</i>	16
The SDSC welcomes applicants for expanding PhD program	18
Surfing the SDSC website	19
Work in Progress	20
SDSC Staff and their Research Interests	23
Contact Us	24



You may care to note from the reporting elsewhere in this Newsletter that SDSC has recently published some outstanding new contributions to strategic thinking – some of it by rising young researchers in the field. Let me encourage you to purchase a selection of the new Canberra Papers and Working Papers. They are excellent value for money and many are truly at the cutting edge of new thinking in our field. An even stronger wave of forward-looking research publications is expected in 2004.

A second priority for the Centre in 2004 will be the continuation of our efforts to encourage and nurture a new generation of high level strategic thinkers. During 2003 the Masters Degree and Graduate Degree Program in Strategy and Defence continued its rapid expansion in both numbers of students and geographical coverage. The program grew to over 90 students in second semester 2003 and higher numbers are anticipated in the New Year. Partner universities, within which up to half of the coursework may be undertaken, now include locations in Perth, Melbourne, Taipei and Tokyo. Other partnership arrangements are in active negotiation in Bangkok, Washington, London, Kingston (Canada), New Delhi and Brisbane. During 2004 substantial additional progress is planned towards achieving our objective of educating and networking the next generation of strategic thinkers across the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean. An important milestone in these efforts will be the opening in February 2004 of tailor-made teaching facilities in the new extension to the H C Coombs Building

2004 is also likely to see a further growth in the numbers of PhD students joining the Centre. By the end of 2003 SDSC had eight PhD students enrolled and was attracting further high quality applications from around the world. Topics on which our current students are focussed include alternative approaches to security in the South Pacific, strategy options for countering terrorism, managing the risks posed by chemical and biological weapons in the Asia-Pacific and the challenges for Australia of capitalising on the revolution in military affairs.

2004 will also see an important new step in our support of undergraduate studies in strategic and security studies. 2003 was the second year of our delivery of the undergraduate major in *Strategic and Security Studies: the Asian Region*, within the Faculty of Asian Studies.

With more than 60 students enrolled in this course in 2003, it has been decided to further strengthen the options for undergraduates in this field by offering a complete degree – the *Bachelor of Security Analysis (Asia-Pacific)* – from 2004. SDSC staff will continue to play a prominent role in the development and delivery of this program and will also provide a 'strategic studies home' for the newly appointed full-time manager of this new degree.

2004 will also see several very distinguished personalities working with the Centre as Visiting Fellows. Amongst these will be Admiral Chris Barrie (former Chief of the Australian Defence Force), Dr Richard Brabin-Smith (former Australian Chief Defence Scientist and Deputy Secretary Strategy in the Department of Defence), Dr Coral Bell, Dr Alan Stephens, Dr Bilveer Singh, from the National University of Singapore, and Dr Sudha Raman from the United Services Institute of India.

Another important initiative for the Centre in 2004 will be the launch of the *Wise Owls' Club*. This is a new SDSC entity that is designed to encourage the involvement of experienced individuals in the broader community to participate in debates, workshops and publications on current and future security and defence challenges in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean region. Further details on how the *Wise Owls' Club* will operate can be found in a later section of this Newsletter. However, let me say here that I am delighted that Commodore Jack McCaffrie (Ret'd) and Brigadier Steve Ayling (Ret'd) have agreed to lead the development of the Club. I hope that all of our readers will welcome this initiative and that many will register to join the Club. You will be very welcome to join us.

While most elements of the outlook for SDSC in 2004 are bright, we also face some challenges in the months ahead. Let me mention just two. First, we need to find ways of increasing the Centre's extremely modest operating budget. There is an urgent need to provide our leading researchers with operational and technical support appropriate to the importance of their work. In order to do this, additional funding will be required.

A second major challenge in coming months will be to make progress in our search for modern office accommodation for Centre staff and our related facilities. Should our readers be able to offer any suggestions or assistance in either of these two respects, I would be delighted to hear from you.

Finally, let me express my deep thanks for the strong expressions of support that I am continuing to receive from many members of the community. Your thoughtfulness and practical assistance is greatly appreciated,

Best wishes,

Ross Babbage
Head SDSC



*Photo of Coombs Building extension
as at 19 December 2003*

THE WISE OWLS CLUB: An Important New SDSC Initiative

The Wise Owls' Club is a new SDSC initiative, of which most readers of this Newsletter are likely to hear a great deal more in coming weeks and months. The Wise Owls' Club is being designed from scratch to foster high-level discussion, debate and publication on current and future security and defence challenges. Over time, it is expected that the Club will make a significant contribution to the Centre's research and publication programs and, more generally, to informed public debate on a wide range of security and defence issues.

The genesis of this initiative was an awareness that in the broader community there is a valuable, but largely untapped, pool of knowledge and experience covering the entire spectrum of security and defence issues. The SDSC wants to take advantage of this expertise and to give these people an opportunity to play an important part in the security debate. We are especially keen to tap the many individuals who have a lifetime's professional experience in the security and defence fields, but who are no longer fully or even partly occupied in their chosen field. We also appreciate that there may be many others who are engaged, perhaps officially or academically, in the national security community and who would appreciate an opportunity to participate in relevant debates in a new, less formal, way.

Whilst it is expected that the membership of the Wise Owls' Club will be mainly Australia-based, there will be no bar to international participation. The only pre-condition for entry will be a general sympathy for the broad aims of the Club.

Initially, the Club will invite members to contribute in two main ways:

- the production of brief reports on current and future security issues; and
- participation in a program of regular workshops on current and future security challenges to be held in Canberra.

Invitations to join the Wise Owls' Club are currently being mailed and it is expected that the Club will begin operating early in 2004. The Wise Owls' Club will have its own website, which will be accessible through the SDSC website. This is expected to come on line during January 2004.

Any reader wishing more information on the Wise Owls' Club is encouraged to contact either of the following:

Commodore Jack McCaffrie, RANR

Phone: 0403 585 509;

Email: jackmccaff@bigpond.com

Brigadier Ayling (Rtd)

Phone 0412 302 116;

Email: steveyayling@bigpond.com

GSSD PROGRAM LAUNCH IN TOKYO

On Monday 1 September 2003 a distinguished group of senior diplomats, officials from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japan Defense Agency, senior academics and others gathered at the United Nations University in Tokyo to formally launch ANU's Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence in Japan. Professor Ramesh Thakur, the Vice Rector of the United Nations University announced that Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations had released a strong statement in support of the program. (Please see the text in next column). Professor Ross Babbage, the Head of SDSC, welcomed the United Nations University as a full partner in the master degree program network and briefed the gathering on the opportunities that the program offers to individuals and key institutions across the region.

In the weeks that followed students for the first time enrolled in the program to take the following elective courses in Tokyo:

- Northeast Asian Security
Dr Hazel Smith
- Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Mr Clive Williams
- Strategic Concepts
Dr Robert Ayson
- Intelligence and Security
Mr Ross Thomas

The GSSD is off to a good start in Tokyo. During 2004, additional new partnerships are expected to be established in Bangkok, Washington, London, New Delhi, Kingston (Canada) and probably elsewhere. Within each of these locations it will be possible for students to undertake up to half of the coursework required for either a Graduate Diploma in Strategic Affairs or one of the two Master Degree options within the program. For further details, please see:

<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/gssd/>


UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

--

Tokyo, 1 September 2003

As the international community grapples with the complex demands of today's rapidly changing security environment, the need to constantly train new generations of strategic thinkers has become abundantly clear. The Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD) programme is an exciting new partnership between the United Nations University and the Australian National University that will prepare students to meet the challenges of the new security agenda in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The programme is also a new chapter in the efforts of the UNU to serve as a globally linked community of scholars engaged in research, postgraduate training and the dissemination of knowledge, dedicated to furthering the purposes and ideals of the United Nations. I very much look forward to the contribution that graduates will make — as experts, policy-makers and concerned citizens — to our ongoing quest for peace, security and development in the 21st century.



Kofi Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations

(photo sourced from:
http://www.un.org/News/oss/sg/pages/sg_biography.html)

GRADUATE STUDIES IN STRATEGY AND DEFENCE: Bigger And Better

The GSSD Program completed its second academic year of activity with over 90 students enrolled in Canberra and the four locations where students are able to undertake specialised elective courses with partner institutions: in Tokyo with United Nations University; in Taipei with National Chengchi University; in Perth with Curtin University; and in Melbourne with Monash University. A particular highlight was the development and staging of new courses in Tokyo and Taipei which attracted locally-based students as well as a group of students flying in from Australia and other countries. This is a major step in the establishment of the region-wide network of strategic studies alumni which is one of the core aims of the GSSD Program.

Another highlight of the program in semester two was the successful running of new courses in Canberra. Courses offered for the first time included Intelligence and Security (taught by Ross Thomas and also offered in Tokyo); Security in Business and Government (taught by Clive Williams and John McFarlane); and Strategic Concepts (taught by Robert Ayson and also offered in Tokyo and Taipei). The Canberra version of Strategic Concepts began with two outstanding presentations by Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman (King's College London), and Intelligence and Security and Security and Business and Government featured presentations from key practitioners in their respective fields.

These new courses proved a good fit with existing elective courses which also proved very popular in 2004: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (Clive Williams); Australian Defence and Strategic Planning (Professor Ross Babbage) and Strategic Planning (Alan Hinge). Additional features of the second half of 2003 included:

- GSSD alumni enrolling as inaugural students of the ANU's new Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (see <http://apcd.anu.edu.au/>)
- Further progress towards new locations for GSSD study including Washington DC, London and Bangkok
- A lively series of guest presentations and seminars including talks by Professor Geoffrey Till (King's College London); Dr Christopher Coker (London School of Economics); Dr Muthiah Alagappa (East-West Center); Ralph Cossa (Pacific Forum CSIS); and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. (US Department of State)
- Continuing high levels of engagement and interest in the program from leading agencies involved in strategic and security affairs
- The appointment of Ms Altaire Harris-Semmens as the GSSD Assistant Administrator (joining GSSD Administrator Jo Higgins to form the high energy team which keeps the program running smoothly).
- Fast progress on the extension of the Coombs Building which will house the new state-of-the-art GSSD teaching and student facilities from February 2004.

THE BOEING LIBRARY

Those interested in conducting serious research on defence and security issues are encouraged to visit the Boeing Library. This is an important collection of publications and materials that is maintained specifically to support SDSC activities. Members of the public may use the Boeing Library between 9am and 5pm (weekdays). Although the borrowing of texts is not permitted, there are study desks and photocopying is available for a minimal fee. The extensive holdings of both books and journals includes around 80 journals with titles such as *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and a number of the *Jane's* publications.

Detailed contents listings are available in electronic format. Also held are annual Defence publications, yearbooks and other statistical journals such as *The Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*. 2003 witnessed a significant increase in the use of the Boeing Library, particularly by students undertaking the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence program, but also by members of the public undertaking research in the areas of defence policy and planning, military studies and regional security issues. Queries may be directed to the Centre Research Assistant, Meredith Thatcher: phone: (61 2) 6125 9931, or email: meredith.thatcher@anu.edu.au.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION PROJECT

In the last quarter of 2003 a start was made on an ambitious project to identify and research the primary options for the Australian Defence system in the 2020 timeframe. In the first phase 16 by-invitation closed workshops were held, each focused on one of the more important challenges for the future. The topics for the workshops included:

- Strategic and Defence Priorities
- Management and Budgetary Priorities
- How to Plan and Conduct Tailored Effects Operations
- Information Superiority and Support Operations
- The Future Role for Defence Industry
- Options for Total Force Structure
- Options for Improved Command and Control
- How to Make Transformation Happen?

Senior Defence officials and servicemen, officials from other departments and agencies, senior businessmen, academics and others with particular expertise on individual topics participated and many valuable new ideas were generated. A summary of the key themes to emerge from this work will be published in the first half of 2004 and a much more detailed book-length analysis of some of the more important defence and security options for the 2020 timeframe is planned for publication in 2005.

This project is led by SDSC's Coordinator of the Australian Defence Studies Program, Professor Ross Babbage, with considerable assistance from the Centre's Post-doctoral Fellow, Dr Brendan Taylor, and a Centre PhD student, Mr Marc Ablong.

VISITOR TO THE SDSC

Professor Yagama Reddy



Professor Yagama Reddy of Sri Venkateswara University visited the SDSC in mid-November 2003. Upon his departure on Monday 17 November, Professor Reddy donated a number of books to the Centre.

(L-R = Professor D Horner, Dr R Ayson, C Michaelsen, Professor Y Reddy, Professor R Babbage, Dr B Taylor, J McFarlane)

UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM

Strategic and Security Studies – the Asian Region

2nd Semester 2003

The Faculty of Asian Studies course in strategic studies continues to be a popular choice for undergraduate students. In this year-long course, the first semester assesses security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region on a country by country basis. The purpose of the second semester is to provide various theoretical and conceptual frameworks in which to develop further the analysis of country case studies. While continuing to examine differing notions of security, the course in second semester aims to address the various types of threats to security that exist in our region.

Under the direction of Professor Ross Babbage as Program Manager, Mr Christian Enemark (course co-ordinator), Mr Cameron Crouch, Ms Anna Powles and Dr Brendan Taylor tutored

the course in second semester. The weekly lectures were delivered by experts from within and outside ANU. They included Rawdon Dalrymple (diplomacy and security), John McFarlane (transnational crime), Clive Williams (terrorism), Alan Dupont (environmental security), Desmond Ball (nuclear and missile proliferation, and information warfare), Christian Enemark (chemical and biological warfare), Robert Ayson (alliance relations) and Ross Babbage (economic security, Australian defence, and future war).

The course 'Strategic and Security Studies – the Asian Region' will become a component of a new degree, Bachelor of Security Analysis (Asia-Pacific), to be launched by the Faculty of Asian Studies in 2004.

STAFF PROFILE

Jo Higgins, Administrator

Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD)



Jo joined GSSD in November 2002, hit the ground running and hasn't stopped since. Her background has been in major events and conference organising, with heavy emphasis on project management, marketing and administration.

The Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence programme has provided her with many opportunities and has kept her busy. Meeting and working with the diverse range of students that the programme attracts has been both a joy and a challenge! An overall marketing plan is underway, as are new frameworks for successful administration and quality assurance systems. In her spare time she has been studying for the Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at the ANU.

Jo looks forward to her continued associations with colleagues, students, academics and others related with the programme in 2004 and beyond.

RECENT SDSC PUBLICATIONS

2003 saw an increased output of publications. Following are abstracts of selected publications. You can view the complete listing at <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdc.publications.php>.

WORKING PAPERS

Working Paper 376 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age: A Case Study of Hizbullah
Rodger Shanahan

The emergence of al-Qa'ida has focused the attention of the West on the threat caused by radical Islamist groups. Hizbullah, or the Party of God, represents another radical Islamist group that has demonstrated the ability to organise itself in a manner that allows it to operate effectively on both the military and socio-political level. Its military success was instrumental in forcing an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000. Unlike many other radical Islamist groups however, Hizbullah plays a significant role in the formal political institutions of Lebanon. This paper examines the environment in which the party operates, the structure and ideological basis of the organisation, as well as the reasons for its success and the limitations it faces within Lebanon. It demonstrates that, despite its colourful rhetoric, the party is a largely pragmatic organisation and that, while it has been a very successful Islamist movement, it faces significant practical limitations in advancing its cause further.

Working Paper 378 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
Trash or Treasure? Knowledge Warfare and the Shape of Future War
David Connery

This paper explains the concept of 'Knowledge Warfare'. Knowledge Warfare is an approach to conflict that views the perceptions of an adversary's leadership group as the centre of gravity, instead of their fielded forces. Knowledge Warfare is a compelling new concept that could provide the conceptual link to complete the current Revolution in Military Affairs. This paper on Knowledge Warfare will no doubt encourage debate in Australia about different approaches to the prosecution of conflict by offering an alternative to 'manoeuvrist approaches' to warfighting in ADF experimentation.

Working Paper 379 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
Biological Weapons: An Overview of Threats and Responses
Christian Enemark

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the existence, nature and scope of the biological weapons (BW) problem, and to examine critically the range of possible solutions. This paper emphasises the technical uniqueness of BW as living weapons intended for use against living targets. BW are dreaded as instruments of state coercion and terrorist intimidation, and a range of responses have been proposed to address these threats. Military responses include deterrence of BW use by threat of nuclear attack, the use of force to destroy BW assets, and defensive biological warfare programs. Medical responses to the BW threat include improved disease surveillance networks and strengthened public health system capabilities. Lastly, the BW problem can be tackled legally through domestic law enforcement and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Working Paper 380 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
Security Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Emerging Complex Arms Race
Desmond Ball

Originally prepared for the Charles Darwin Symposium on 'The Eye of the Storm: Northern Australia's Location in an Arc of Instability', Darwin, 29-30 September 2003, this paper is divided into four principal parts. The first part discusses the political and security impact of the war on terror on this region. The second part describes the recent trends in regional defence expenditures and acquisitions. It briefly outlines the main new capabilities most commonly being acquired in the region, noting where relevant the particular influences of the war on terror. Special attention is drawn to naval acquisitions and the issue of an 'emergent naval arms race' in the region. It also discusses a couple of particular developments, viz: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and information warfare (IW), which received substantial impetus from the war on terror, but whose implications are relatively unexplored. The third part describes the state of proliferation of WMD and associated delivery systems in this region. Finally, the fourth part argues that the war on terror should not be allowed to distract policy-makers and analysts from other erstwhile and potentially more

consequential regional security issues, and that the opportunities created by September 11 for greater regional security cooperation should be exploited to ameliorate the disturbing trends.


Working Paper 382 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
China's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Satellite Programs
Desmond Ball

China has exhibited a spasmodic interest in development of an ELINT satellite capability since it began its military space program in the late 1960s. It has experimented with several different sorts of ELINT spacecraft and satellite configurations, including single, dedicated ELINT satellites, small doublets and triplets, and ELINT packages on large multi-mission satellites. It is likely that ELINT packages have been deployed aboard some PHOTINT, communications and 'experimental technology' satellites, as well as the *Shenzhou* spacecraft developed for China's manned space program. This paper describes these Chinese SIGINT satellite programs, including the management and control structure, the satellite systems, and prospective developments.

Working Paper 383 *Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = A\$8.80)*
The End of Strategy: Effects-Based Operations
Alan Stephens

The Western model of war remains subject to a number of structural weaknesses, including cost, a 'platform-centric' mentality and organisation, a dependence on legacy systems, and an excessive focus on generating physical (as opposed to cognitive and/or informational) effects. The Australian Defence Force reflects all of those weaknesses, to the extent that it may find the existing model unsustainable. The concept of Effects-Based Operations represents a *philosophical* response to this problem. Unlike the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs and Network-Centric Warfare, which respectively have been one-dimensional (technology without doctrine) and strategically insufficient (a mere enabling mechanism), EBO establishes a logic-flow between Ends, Ways and Means at all levels of strategic thinking. Consequently, it has the potential not only to strengthen the existing model, but also to expand it into a whole-of-nation approach to security. EBO can reinvigorate the West's greatest asymmetric advantage and represents a rare opportunity for those few nations capable of mastering it.

CANBERRA PAPERS




Canberra Paper 148 *Cost \$A20.00 (+ GST = A\$22.00)*
The Road to War on Iraq
Ron Huisken

Between November 2001 and September 2002, the Bush administration tried to prepare the US, and the rest of the world, for pre-emptive military action to remove the Iraqi regime and bring that country into full and durable compliance with UN resolutions under a new, democratic government. It was a costly exercise. The US succeeded for a time in making itself, rather than Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the principal source of international concern. Iraq became the most divisive issue the international community has encountered in over 30 years, damaging severely both the 'western' community and the newer major power alignments that had emerged since the end of the Cold War. This monograph seeks to explain what appears to have been a massive failure of international diplomacy, and to consider its implications for the longer term. The discussion is divided into two parts. Part I addresses the crisis from the standpoint of the principal actors, especially the United States. Part II focuses on Australia. Australia's path was necessarily shaped very strongly by the 'main game', but it did have distinctive aspects which, in turn, suggest distinctive implications for foreign and defence policy in the future.

Canberra Paper 149 Cost \$A23.00 (+ GST = A\$25.30)

The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah
Brek Batley


In his paper, Brek Batley uses the JI network as a case study to explore the range of problems facing Southeast Asia in the management of radical Islam in Southeast Asia.



Canberra Paper 150 Cost \$A18.00 (+ GST = A\$19.80)


Burma's Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised?
Andrew Selth

Burma's importance in world affairs has long derived from its critical geo-strategic position. Another factor now attracting the interest of Western scholars and officials is the Muslim community's growing international connections, which in the case of one insurgent group at least includes direct links to pan-Islamic extremist organisations. The relationship between some Burmese Muslims and international terrorist groups like *Al Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah* are likely to attract even greater interest from the US government and its allies. In this regard, the global war against terrorism launched in 2001 has become both a burden and an opportunity for the Rangoon regime.



Canberra Paper 151 Cost \$A [to be advised]
Ballistic Missile Defence for Australia: Policies, Requirements and Options
Stephan Frühling

The proliferation of missiles of longer and longer range continues throughout the world, and Australia may come within the range of missiles from North Korea and Iran in the coming decade. Australia must define what role ballistic missile defence systems should play in the overall BMD architecture and what exactly Australia wants to achieve with its BMD systems: defending the Australian homeland against direct or seaborne attack, defence of forward deployed troops or strengthening the US Alliance. After examining the technical aspects of several possible Australian BMD architectures, the paper concludes with recommendations for Australia's ballistic missile defence policy.



Canberra Paper 152 *Cost \$A [to be advised]*
***ASEAN, Australia and the Management of
The Jemaah Islamiyah Threat***
Bilveer Singh

In his paper, Bilveer Singh examines the nature of the JI threat. This terrorist challenge sees groups basically calling for the establishment of a political system that is more Islamic in character whether it exists either nationally or in a specified territory within a national state. Yet, JI is a regional terrorist organisation and desires the establishment of a regional Islamic state forming a new Islamic epicentre in the Asia-Pacific region. The nature of JI, the challenge it poses, the measures that have been adopted to manage it and the long-term consequences of the JI phenomenon are analysed in this study.

Canberra Paper 153 *Cost \$A [to be advised]*
***Arming the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF):
Trends and Implications***
Bilveer Singh

This paper traces the trend of recent arms procurements of Singapore and discusses its implications. What are the implications for Singapore and Malaysia as both countries become more heavily armed with advanced weaponry? How will the "precarious balance" be managed? How will this interactive arms-relationship end? This paper aims to explore the essence of these questions and hopes to serve as an update to the existing literature on the Singapore military build-up. The study is divided into a number of parts. First, it revisits historical facts and current events to provide a basis for Singapore's threat perception and explains how Malaysia is so deeply entrenched within Singapore's security planning. Second, it traces the trend of recent arms procurements by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The final part reveals the various implications of the growing military imbalance between Singapore and Malaysia.

SDSC Publications Ordering Information

Abstracts of recent SDSC publications and a complete list of publications in print are available through the SDSC's home page: <<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc>>. A full list of publications will be sent out on request.

- Ordering is available by phone, fax, email or post.
- The cost of packaging and postage by surface mail is included in all book prices. **There is a 15% discount for books collected personally from the SDSC.**
- (Note: GST is payable on books within Australia.)

Method of Payment

- *Customers within Australia:* cheque, money order or credit card.
- *Overseas Customers:* bank draft (in Australian dollars) or credit card.
- All cheques and bank drafts should be made payable to 'The Australian National University'.

TO: Publications Sales * = voluntary information
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Building 6, Fellows Road
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Phone: + 61 (0) 2 6125 9921
Fax: + 61 (0)2 6248 0816; E-mail: sdsc@anu.edu.au.

I would like to purchase the following **SDSC Publications:**

____ copies of Canberra Paper No. ____
____ copies of Working Paper No. ____

Name: _____

Address: _____

* Fax no: _____

* Email: _____

I enclose a cheque/money order/bank draft for \$A **OR**
I wish to pay by Credit Card: Bankcard/Mastercard/
Visa/American Express (*please specify*):

Credit Card no. ____/____/____/____

Expiry date: ____/____

Name on Credit Card: _____

Signature: _____

SHOW ME THE WMD!

Searching for Biological Weapons in Iraq

CHRISTIAN ENEMARK

Prior to the commencement of the Iraq War in March 2003, the US presented the United Nations (UN) with intelligence information intended to show that Iraq was running weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in contravention of UN resolutions. Disarming the Iraqi regime of alleged WMD was put forward as the main goal of, and justification for, the US-led attack on Iraq. In the aftermath of the war, the failure of the US and its allies to produce conclusive evidence of Iraq's WMD has reignited the fierce pre-war political debate over whether going to war was the right thing to do.

Since the fall of Baghdad, the WMD search activities of the Pentagon's 1400-strong Iraq Survey Group (ISG) have so far cost almost \$US1 billion.¹ In his October 2003 Interim Report to the US Congress, ISG leader David Kay emphasised the enormity of his team's task when he observed that "[a]ny actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be ... difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search procedures."² To the surprise of some observers, Kay's report concluded that the combined effect of sanctions, inspections and US air attacks in 1991 and 1998 had effectively destroyed Iraq's ability to produce chemical weapons after the Gulf War. He had also found no evidence that Iraq undertook significant steps, following the expulsion of UN weapons inspectors in 1998, to build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.³ And so much of the attention on Iraq WMD has now turned to finding biological weapons (BW).

As the search for WMD proceeds in earnest, the hunters are likely to find that BW present the greatest challenge of all. To begin with, the idea that an item identifiable as a 'biological weapon' can be 'found' does not make any sense. A biological weapon is better described as a process rather than a physical object. A pathogenic micro-organism is chosen, then cultured and produced in large quantities through a fermentation process, inserted into a delivery mechanism such as a spray device, and disseminated in such a way that it survives atmospheric conditions on its way to infecting human targets and causing disease.

Finding BW is really about assembling evidence of a working biological warfare program. Evidence of the production of pathogenic agents is not proof positive of such a venture — a means of agent weaponisation must be apparent as well, and established plans for deployment would confirm an offensive purpose. For example, a vat of anthrax in a liquid slurry form poses little danger until the bacteria are dried and weaponised for aerosol delivery. Much of the search for BW in post-war Iraq has so far concentrated on the production of biological agents rather than the means of weaponising them. On the issue of WMD delivery systems, Kay's Interim Report addressed cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Iraqis reportedly had doubts about whether biological agents would survive in ballistic missile warheads, and the ISG has yet to establish that Iraq was able to disperse them using converted UAVs carrying spray tanks.⁴ Kay did not mention cruise missiles ever being used in conjunction with BW.

Finding evidence of a BW program is complicated by the so-called 'dual use' problem — that is, biological agents and equipment can also be employed for legitimate, peaceful purposes such as research and vaccine production. For example, Kay reported that Iraq had concealed from the UN new research on the BW-applicable agents *Brucella* and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). However, putting aside whether Iraq was remiss in not reporting its research to the UN, there may be more plausible explanations for the retention of these agents. No country has ever been known to have weaponised CCHF, and the WHO reports that the virus is endemic in many countries in Africa, Europe and Asia, including Iraq. This means Iraq could have had legitimate public health reasons to be working on CCHF. Similarly, the livestock disease *Brucella* is endemic in Iraq. Although US military scientists weaponised this agent during the Cold War, they did not consider it effective because it was slow acting and can be treated with antibiotics.⁵

Unlike nuclear warheads or chemical-filled munitions, it is in the nature of BW that stockpiles of such weapons are highly unlikely to be found in ready-to-use form. Rather, BW typically constitute

a just-in-time capability, the assembly of which takes place at short notice. That is what Kay envisages was the nature of Iraq's BW program after 1996. For example, an ISG team found hidden in the home of an Iraqi scientist a vial containing a reference strain of live *Clostridium botulinum Okra B* bacteria. The theory is that this tiny stock of material could be a starting point from which to surge production of BW⁶, in this case the deadly botulinum toxin.

Against this theory, however, there are three reasons to suggest that the substance was never intended to be part of an active BW program. Firstly, the scientist had been storing the vial in his refrigerator for 10 years since 1993, the particular strain of botulinum (Okra B) having apparently been originally produced by the American Type Culture Collection for licensed export to Iraq in the late 1980s. Secondly, the bacteria were found in a collection of 'reference strains' of other relatively harmless biological organisms that could not be used to produce BW. Reference strains are retained for use in identifying unidentified agents. Thirdly, there is no evidence that Iraq or any other country has ever succeeded in using the Okra B strain for warfare purposes. According to BW expert Raymond Zilinskas, the botulinum toxin derived from this strain (which commonly causes food poisoning resulting from improper canning) disperses quickly in the air, making it ineffective as an airborne agent for weapons.⁷

Information uncovered by the ISG that suggests a pre-war Iraqi BW program has so far included research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities.⁸ None of this is conclusive but it is highly suggestive to suspicious minds. For those seeking more tangible evidence of BW, one of the most talked-about issues has been the discovery of two Iraqi trailers, alleged to be part of a mobile biological warfare production unit. These trailers, found by US forces in April and May 2003, were described in a CIA report as 'the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program'.⁹ However, the trailers have been the subject of intense debate within the intelligence community, with experts divided on technical grounds over whether they could actually have produced BW. In a retreat from the CIA's earlier confidence, Kay in his ISG Interim Report was non-committal about the significance of the trailers.

The final report on the search for WMD will probably leave many observers unsatisfied, especially with regard to BW. However, this should not be regarded as a failure by the ISG. Rather, the experience of previous UN inspections showed that 'finding' BW in Iraq was never going to be a straightforward task. A nuclear missile, a rifle or a land mine is a readily identifiable item and has but one use — as a weapon. A 'biological weapon' is a process (production and weaponisation) rather than an object, and the dual-use nature of biological agents and equipment means that 'finding' that process is complicated.

Before March 2003, it was politically difficult for the US to justify its war against Iraq prospectively on the basis of WMD intelligence. Now, many months later, the vexed issue of 'finding' BW suggests there are huge technical obstacles to establishing a justification retrospectively. Technical obstacles aside, a better device for winning political acceptance of the search results would have been to establish an independent inspection process. While there is no reason to doubt the professional integrity of David Kay, a former UN weapons inspector who now reports to the CIA, it has to be acknowledged that the ISG search was commissioned by a country that has a vested interest in proving the existence of WMD. With little evidence so far that active nuclear and chemical programs existed in Iraq immediately before the war, the political danger for the US now is that BW too might never be found.

Notes

1. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'Weapons Search Black Hole Deepens', 3 October 2003.
2. Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 October 2003. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/da_vid_kay_10022003.html> (3 October 2003)
3. Ibid.
4. Statement by David Kay, 2 October 2003.
5. *Los Angeles Times*, 'Experts Downplay Bioagent', 17 October 2003.
6. Statement by David Kay, 2 October 2003.
7. *Global Security Newswire*, 'Officials Dispute Whether Iraq Had an Active Biological Weapons Program', 6 October 2003. <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/10/6/10p.html> (16 November 2003); *Los Angeles Times*, 'Experts Downplay Bioagent', 17 October 2003.
8. Statement by David Kay, 2 October 2003.
9. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, 28 May 2003: p1. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/paper_w.pdf> (2 August 2003)

LIVING WITH A WOUNDED SUPERPOWER

CORAL BELL

There is an old American joke which goes like this. A family has just adopted a new pet, an 800- pound gorilla. 'But where does he sit?' a friend asks. Answer: 'Just any place he chooses.' The world is in somewhat the same situation vis-à-vis the US at the moment. No other power, or current alliance of powers, can really argue with it militarily or economically for the time being, though they still do diplomatically. So the old and often-denounced balance of power system [which was indeed the source of many evils] is in abeyance, and the world is thus in a unipolar phase of international history. That is a very unusual situation: in fact the most recent parallel is Rome two millennia ago. The question that has been engaging foreign policy intellectuals in Washington and elsewhere recently is whether that means, as in Rome's case, an overtly imperial role. Certainly, quite a few American legions are abroad at the moment. But the US electorate does not like long-running foreign commitments and is already restive at the human and financial costs of Iraq. The Democrats hoping for election next year are already calling for the resignation of the Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld and his influential Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz.

A lot will obviously depend on the next US election. American conservatives come in three main varieties. Most familiar used to be the 'conservative realists', who included many notable policy-makers like Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, as well as academic analysts like Sam Huntington. They tend to be internationalist, fully conscious of the importance of alliances and concerned recently that the US may have bitten off more than it can chew in Iraq. Then there are the traditional conservatives, ordinary far-right Republicans, who tend towards isolationism. Their last candidate for President, Pat Buchanan, has made some of the harshest criticism of Bush's interventionism. The most publicised group in the past two years, the 'neo-conservatives', are far-right radicals who might more accurately be called Utopian or even 'neo-imperialist' when one is thinking of their agenda for the Arab world. Their star has been dominant in Washington in the past two years, but it might

wane rapidly if things continue to go wrong in Iraq or if there is a new man in the White House.

Whatever that outcome, the 'conservative realists' are likeliest to be back in favour as the major influence on US foreign policy. The more ambitious drives for change would probably fall off the agenda, and Washington would mend its alliances. But if the US sees itself as deserted by old allies, really isolated, it could move from unilateralism to isolationism, which could make for a very unpredictable world, as hinted at in Tony Blair's speeches.

For Washington strategists planning Iraq, the 1999 campaign in another Muslim area, Kosovo, may have been a misleading experience in two respects: not only the virtual absence of returning body-bags, but an aftermath of very large political change in the whole region, South East Europe. For the neo-conservatives in Washington it became a hopeful potential parallel for the Arab Gulf states. 'Democracy by domino effect' it was called. The fall of Iraq, as the first domino, through outside military intervention might in time produce regime change, more slowly, by intensifying internal political and social pressures, even perhaps in Iran.

Painful as the present stages in Iraq and Afghanistan may be, it is too early to say that such a hope was illusory. Several regimes in the region have in fact resiled from previous stances, including Saudi Arabia. And even in Kosovo, the aftermath of war took several years to generate significant change in the neighbourhood. The truly crucial question is whether the patience of the US electorate will be equal to the burdens and costs imposed on them before Iraq and Afghanistan can be turned into reasonably stable and viable states, at least approaching democracy. We will not know that for a year or more.

What needs to be done in the meantime is to construct a sort of safety-net under the operation by internationalising it. Even governments which were opposed to the US invasion of Iraq have a stake in the success of the occupation because its failure would re-invigorate the *ihadists*. And they are enemies of the entire society of states, especially moderate Muslim governments, who are the most vulnerable targets. That is why many of

their attacks have been on tourist haunts in such countries, including Indonesia. The project is to destroy the assets and deter the investment by which the local people live, and thus undermine the political structure.

In Afghanistan, a degree of internationalisation has already been secured by NATO, but for Iraq it must be the UN, to secure the co-operation of powers like Russia and China. Those governments will however want a share of the decision-making as well as the burdens, and that might make for difficulties in the chain of command, unless the combat tasks can be separated from the civilian ones and as much power as possible can be passed to the new Iraqi authorities.

The battle over how that can be done has had one surprising side-effect. It has enhanced the power and status of the UN by actually giving it a more important function than it has had since the earliest days after its foundation in 1945. It has become the chief forum for negotiation of the conventions and indeed perhaps the whole future of the unipolar world. That is because only in the Security Council do the other four permanent members have a nominal but legal mode of asserting equality with Washington: the veto mechanism. France, China and Russia, the potential 'opposition' among the 'permanent five', do not have military or economic equality with the US, but they do have that one useful (though profoundly undemocratic) hangover from the diplomatic bargaining processes of 1945, when the UN was being brought into existence. They can deny the US the stamp of legitimacy for military operations like the occupation of Iraq. That does not prevent Washington from taking military action (as it did in March 2003) but it can make the aftermath expensive and discomfiting, as it has been in the past few months.

France in particular appears to be enjoying an almost reckless use of this privilege. Maybe President Chirac has decided to take over Britain's old role as leader of the potential anti-hegemonial alliance, the US being of course the new potential hegemon. From the days of the Spanish Armada to those of Hitler that used to be Britain's rife, but in those days the potential hegemon was merely a European power — Spain, Austria, Napoleonic France, the Kaiser's Germany. Now it is a power of an altogether different order of magnitude, and its true future challengers will have to be other potential world powers of the order of China and India. Unless, just possibly, France could 'deliver' Europe as a

whole, and that seems to me very unlikely. Many Europeans already identify their security and economic interest as resting, over the long term, as much with the US as with France or Germany.

The UN's founders gave it quite ambitious military functions, through a body called the Military Staff Committee, which has been so obscure for almost the past fifty-eight years that hardly anyone has even heard of it. But it still exists, and the present conflict might even inspire the Security Council to look again at whether its theoretical powers might usefully be made actual, for the sorts of military operations the world might be facing over the next decade, against transnational rather than international adversaries. Not only the jihadists, but other 'non-state actors', like drug-runners, people smugglers and pirates.

If that can be done successfully, Iraq might even become a milestone in the evolution of a *modus vivendi* now needed by all the world's governments: how to live with a superpower without being overlaid. Developing some norms and conventions about diplomatic and military burden sharing should reduce the nationalist irritations that this unfamiliar phase of history is bound to generate.

The struggle with the *jihadists* whose chosen 'field of *jihad*' will probably remain Iraq, might even give new life, with luck, to a concept which has tended to be dismissed as Utopian for most of the past seventy years: the concept of global collective security. It was of course originally embodied in the League of Nations, and later in the United Nations. Each was defined in its hopeful early days as 'a league against an unknown enemy'. Trouble was that, until 9/11, every maker of foreign policy believed that he or she knew who the next enemy was likely to be. The prospective danger always had a national face: Russian or Chinese or American or Indian or Pakistani, and so on down the list. No longer is that the case. We may know in general who the *jihadists* are, but we cannot know where the next blow will come, against whom, or what nationalities will be among the group who deliver it. The first batch of prisoners taken to Guantanamo Bay was of forty nationalities, and had lived in sixty countries. So the notion of a 'league against an unknown enemy' has more logic and relevance in the present context than it had in the old context where the quarrels were international, not transnational. It would be a splendid irony if the efforts of the *jihadists* to undermine the contemporary society of states had the side-effect of reviving its most constructive and idealistic dream.

WHAT ASIO NEEDS: Better Resources, Not More Powers

CHRISTOPHER MICHAELSEN

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and of 12 October 2002 in Bali have not changed the world, but they have led to a dramatic change in the perception of international terrorism. The unthinkable turned into reality and it became clear that the so-called 'war on terrorism' was to be one of the defining conflicts of the early 21st century. Governments around the world enacted new legislation as part of their campaign to combat international terrorism. Canberra has been no exception. In an attempt to strengthen Australian law, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a first anti-terrorism package containing five bills in early 2002. The second cornerstone of Australia's new anti-terrorism laws was meant to be the ASIO Bill.¹ First introduced into Parliament on 21 March 2002, the Bill was rejected by the Senate on 13 December 2002. It was reintroduced into Parliament on 20 March 2003 subject to some minor amendments. Fearing that another refusal to pass the legislation would trigger a double dissolution election, Labor abandoned its resistance in the Senate, and a slightly modified ASIO Bill was finally enacted on 26 June 2003.

Under the new legislation ASIO has been given unprecedented powers that allow it to gather intelligence on possible terrorist threats to Australia. In particular, the Act authorises ASIO to seek a warrant to detain and question people for up to seven days. Persons detained do not need to be suspected of any offence and can be taken into custody without charges being laid or even the possibility that they might be laid at a later stage. It is sufficient that an 'issuing authority' has 'reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence'. An 'issuing authority' is defined as a person, appointed by the Minister, who is either a federal magistrate or a judge. While detained and questioned, people are compelled by law to 'give the information, record or thing requested in accordance with the warrant'. Failure to do so is punishable with up to five years imprisonment.

These and other provisions make the ASIO Act one of the toughest anti-terrorism legislations in the Western world and provide ASIO with sweeping powers that even comparable overseas agencies like the American FBI or British MI5 neither have nor seek. Furthermore, several passages of the new legislation are inconsistent with Australia's obligations under international law.² As a consequence, rather than increasing security, the ASIO Act may in fact achieve adverse effects. Perceived as repressive and discriminatory, it might lead to an inflamed sense of grievance and injustice, particularly among the Muslim community.³ This in turn could further alienate and isolate even so-called moderates, foster sympathy and support for fundamental religious fanatics and, thus, eventually destabilise Australia's liberal democratic society itself. It remains therefore to be seen whether the new laws provide any protection against future terrorist attacks or, in the long term, rather damage the democratic way of life one is actually trying to defend.

In early November 2003, only four months after the ASIO Act had been enacted, ASIO's new detention and investigation powers were already found to be insufficient. Although not even attempting to apply the new laws in the 'Willie Brigitte affair',⁴ Attorney-General Philip Ruddock argued that the arrest and deportation of the French terrorist suspect had highlighted flaws in the current system. Claiming that ASIO's powers were 'clearly inadequate' and Australia's legislation only 'third and fourth best', the Attorney-General subsequently called for further amendments of the ASIO Act.⁵ Calls for even more stringent legislation make little sense. What is more, they divert attention from the fact that it may not be the legislation that is 'third and fourth best', but ASIO itself.

Australia's key domestic intelligence agency has been seriously degraded over the past 15 years. From 1988 to 1998, its numbers were slashed by a third from about 800 to 535. It now has only 587 full-time staff to monitor a country of 20 million.⁶ With a staff-population ratio of 1: 34,071,

ASIO remains significantly smaller than its US counterpart (ratio of 1: 10,094).⁷ It is also smaller than comparable domestic security agencies in Canada (ratio of 1: 15,212) and New Zealand (ratio of 1: 27,857).⁸ Although ASIO predicts that staff numbers will increase to 830 over the next two years, the length of the recruitment process remains a major problem.⁹ Under-staffing might lead to intelligence officers being overworked. This in turn may be one of the causes for ASIO's relatively high separation rate that ran at about 10.4 per cent in 2002, 2.4 per cent higher than the present Public Service-wide rate.¹⁰ The *ASIO Report to Parliament 2001-2002* revealed that major reasons for current staff contemplating leaving the agency were prospects of better promotion opportunities, increased remuneration, greater job satisfaction, better training and development opportunities and greater rewards and recognition to be found elsewhere.¹¹ However, part of a successful long-term strategy against international terrorism lies in retaining staff with relevant experience. An ongoing loss of experience and corporate memory would be certainly catastrophic, particularly in the light of claims that ASIO is already lacking intelligence experience in senior ranks.¹²

Maybe even more alarming, ASIO's staff is seriously lacking in language and cultural skills. Although most of the agency's operational work now involves investigating Australians with links to al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah and other Islamic extremists groups, only two to three per cent of ASIO officers speak any Arabic. As ASIO Director-General Richardson revealed, one can count the number of Arabic speakers inside ASIO on three hands.¹³ Some Arabic dialects are not spoken at all. Even so, the numbers of Australian recruits with Muslim or Middle Eastern backgrounds are very low. None of the ASIO graduates of November 2002 came from a non-English speaking background.¹⁴ There were no Muslims and only one of the graduates spoke any other language — a woman fluent in Indonesian. Among the new recruits about to graduate in late 2003, only one has a Muslim background.¹⁵ It is striking that the term 'language skills' is not mentioned even once in the 126 pages of ASIO's latest Report to Parliament.

In order to respond effectively to the threat from international terrorism, Australia does not need further laws, nor does ASIO need more

powers. But what ASIO does need are better resources. Rather than trying to turn 'terrorism laws' and 'national security' into an election-winning issue for 2004, the Government should focus on enhancing the quality of Australia's key domestic intelligence agency. To better protect Australia from possible terrorist attacks, it is essential to improve ASIO's staffing situation. Emphasis should be put on developing staff experience, building corporate memory and recruiting ethnic officers, men and woman with relevant language and cultural backgrounds. After all, what is the point of further expanding the agency's powers when currently ASIO officers are not even able to understand Willie Brigitte or one of his friends making phone calls to Islamic extremist associates in Australia or overseas?

Notes

1. *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002* (Cth).
2. Christopher Michaelsen, 'International Human Rights on Trial – the UK's and Australia's Legal Response to 9/11' *Sydney Law Review* vol. 25, no.3, September 2003: pp.275–303. Several provisions of the ASIO Act violate essential and non-derogable provisions of the *UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child*.
3. See e.g. Les Kennedy, 'Targets of ASIO raids consider legal action' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 October 2003.
4. Willie Brigitte, a French national and suspected member of the radical Pakistani group Laskar-e-Taiba, was arrested in Sydney on 9 October 2003 for breaking immigration laws and deported to France 9 days later. Although Brigitte arrived in Australia in May 2003 on a tourist visa, it was not until late September that French authorities alerted ASIO about his presence and possible connections to Islamic extremists.
5. Cynthia Banham, 'ASIO law inferior insists Ruddock' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 November 2003. Indeed, a new bill amending the ASIO Act and further extending the agency's powers passed the Senate on 4 December 2003.
6. ASIO 'Report to Parliament 2002-2003', p.115.
7. Even if one includes ASIO's additional part-time and casual staff (81) (ratio of 1: 29,940), the agency remains still smaller than its US, Canadian and New Zealand counterparts.
8. Nigel Brew, 'Dollars and Sense: Trends in ASIO Resourcing', Research Note No. 44, 23 June 2003, Department of the Parliamentary Library.
9. ASIO 'Report to Parliament 2002-2003', pp.63-4.
10. ASIO 'Report to Parliament 2001-2002', p.51; However, according to the 'Report to Parliament 2002-2003' ASIO's attrition rate has apparently dropped to seven percent in 2003.
11. ASIO 'Report to Parliament 2001-2002', p.51.
12. John Lyons, 'Welcome to his nightmare' *The Bulletin*, 30 April 2003.
13. Ibid.
14. 'Why it's "really cool" to be a spy' *The Age*, 22 October 2002.
15. Ibid.

THE SDSC WELCOMES APPLICANTS FOR EXPANDING PhD PROGRAM

The SDSC has historically supervised a small number of doctoral students. The norm in past decades has been about 2 to 3 students at any given time, and these students have gone on to senior positions both inside and outside the ANU. But as part of the Centre's aim of meeting the need for a new generation of strategic thinkers and leaders, a major expansion of the SDSC's PhD program is now well underway. Applications from well-qualified candidates to undertake PhDs in strategic studies are being actively welcomed by the Centre (see details below).

By mid 2004 the Centre expects to be supervising approximately a dozen PhD students, all working on cutting-edge research into issues of close relevance to the contemporary security challenges facing Australia, the Asia-Pacific region and the international community. Topics under study (and about to be studied) by the SDSC's doctoral students include:

- Approaches to security in the South Pacific
- Counter-terrorism as political warfare
- Asia-Pacific Regional security cooperation
- Biological weapons issues in the Asia-Pacific
- Australia's revolution in military affairs
- The response to terrorism by liberal democracies
- Australia's offshore military projection
- The strategic paradigms of the US and China
- US Security Policy & the Relevance of Bargaining Strategies

The Program already features international and 'domestic' (Australian and New Zealand) students with domestic students able to conduct their research on either a full-time or part-time basis. Another feature is the interdisciplinary backgrounds of many of the students in the program, a number of whom also come to the Centre with extensive work experience in relevant professions. Given the strong policy emphasis in strategic studies, the Centre is very keen to ensure that its graduates are equipped not only with strong records in academic research, but also possess a range of skills to

meet the demands of the varied and competitive employment market. One key feature of the SDSC PhD experience is the unique opportunity for networking which the Centre, the ANU and the Canberra community can provide.

The Centre recognises that one of the main challenges facing prospective PhD students is funding. A series of initiatives have been taken to make scholarship (and other) funding available and likely for the best candidates.

1. Candidates whom the SDSC regards as suitable for doctoral study and who have proposed appropriate topics of study are strongly supported by the Centre in ANU scholarship rounds. In 2002 and 2003 PhD applicants for the SDSC have succeeded in obtaining three APA/GSS scholarships (which are now open to both Australian and New Zealand candidates).
2. In mid-2003 two students joined the Centre as recipients of the Sir Arthur Tange PhD Scholarships generously funded by the Australian Department of Defence.
3. The Centre and the ANU Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies are jointly funding two new SDSC PhD Scholarships which are open to both domestic and international students. These scholarships provide a standard PhD stipend (but do not cover the tuition fees payable by international students). Applications close on 24 February 2004 and details are available on the SDSC website at <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/>
4. Part-time employment opportunities exist for PhD students as tutors in strategic studies undergraduate and graduate courses and from time to time on special project work.

The Centre is keen to explore new avenues for PhD scholarship funding including potential corporate sponsorship, including possible scholarships for international students given the very limited numbers of these available through the current system.

Candidates wishing to consider PhD studies at the Centre are warmly encouraged to contact the SDSC. Information is available at: <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/phd.html>.

Potential doctoral students should email robert.ayson@anu.edu.au (or give him a call on +61 2 61259923) and indicate:

- The proposed topic area
- Academic achievements and work experience
- Whether study is dependent on receiving a scholarship
- The timeframe for commencing PhD studies
- (For domestic students) whether full-time or part-time study is preferred (international students need to be full-time).

Candidates for scholarships in particular need to note that the competition is intense. To be eligible outstanding academic records are

required (normally 1st class honours or equivalent). Students on full-time doctoral study need to plan to submit their theses around the 36 month mark.

Students are appointed a panel of supervisors (normally of three people) with the Chief Supervisor from the SDSC. The Centre is able to offer supervision across a wide range of strategic studies topics which coincide with the research interests of its full-time staff. Special efforts are made to provide suitable office space and computer facilities to support the studies of PhD candidates, to include them in the broader life of the Centre and to encourage their research careers including the publication of their work.

A dynamic, flourishing and leading edge PhD program is one of the Centre's core priorities. Those wishing to consider doctoral studies are warmly encouraged to contact us to discuss their research interests.

Robert Ayson

SURFING THE SDSC WEBSITE

<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/>

The SDSC website serves as both an informative and practical way to not only connect with staff and students, but to also see what is currently happening at the Centre.

On the homepage you will find an introduction to the Centre, any 'latest news' items and a **What's new?** section. The current 'What's new?' item is the Australian National Universities placing in the *Academic Ranking of World Universities — 2003* published by Shanghai Jiao Tong University on 12 December 2003. You can also download the **latest newsletter** (in pdf format). Other items accessible from the SDSC homepage are noted below:

- **About us** describes 'Who we are' as a Centre and includes our mission statement. The Centre focuses on four key areas: research and analysis; education and training; outreach and liaison; and finally the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD) program.
- **Staff & Students** lists and/or profiles Academic staff, AUS-SCAP, Core Staff, Visitors and PhD Scholars. As the SDSC expands, expect to see colour photos and amended profiles added to this page.

- **Links** offers 100+ domestic and international links to other academic and research institutions, government and military bodies, non-government organisations, and media.
- **Publications** lists (including abstracts) the latest publications offered for sale by the Centre, together with purchasing information. The SDSC produced 13 Working papers and 7 Canberra Papers in 2003 and this number is set to increase in the coming year. An abridged listing and publication order form appear at the back of the latest publications.
- **Viewpoint** carries occasional shorter pieces from members of staff and students.
- **Postgraduate studies (GSSD)** provides a link to the GSSD homepage. This site provides information on the GSSD program, including program requirements and course outlines.

Links to other Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies departments and the ANU can be found at the top of the SDSC homepage.

So take time out to visit the SDSC website, navigate your way around the pages and peruse the content. For further information, you can always **Contact us**.

WORK IN PROGRESS

During recent months, **Professor Ross Babbage** focused primarily on the administration and development of the SDSC. Nevertheless, he also completed the preparation of a major reference book, of which he is the primary author, entitled *The Military Capabilities of the Major Powers in the Asia-Pacific*. He has, in addition, been actively engaged as the primary author of a second book, entitled *Australia's Military Capabilities*. This volume was in advanced draft by the end of the year. During recent months Professor Babbage has also launched a major multi-year research project on *Australia's Defence Transformation Options for 2020*, on which a brief report appears elsewhere in this Newsletter. In addition, Professor Babbage coordinated and taught the GSSD Course *Australian Defence and Strategic Planning* in Canberra, Melbourne and Perth and he provided management oversight of the undergraduate major; *Strategic and Security Studies – The Asian Region*.

Professor Paul Dibb has written three major papers in the last 12 months on Australia's defence debate and the pros and cons of likely force structure and budgetary outcomes. He expects to have these published together early next year by the SDSC. He is also working on the implications for Australia of the rise of the US to global dominance and what this means for the alliance, as well as examining the prospects for increased competition and tension between the major powers.

Professor Paul Dibb and **Dr Richard Brabin-Smith** plan to start a major new project in 2004 on the development of Australia's official strategic guidance over the last 30 years. They will consult a range of official publications, government documents released under the 30 year rule and relevant academic books and papers, as well as interviewing senior political, military and public service officers involved in the development of Australia's defence policy. They plan to publish a book on this topic.

Professor Desmond Ball, as Co-Chair (with Professor Anthony Milner) of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP), has been heavily engaged in various CSCAP projects. In particular, he has visited Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta on several occasions in connection with an Australian counter-terrorist initiative announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in March, and which involved the organisation of a forum in Jakarta in December which considered practical proposals for enhanced cooperation in the region.

Professor Ball's primary research activities concern human security issues in the Thailand-Burma borderlands, and China and Information Warfare (IW). He visited the Thai-Burma border in December, and has a book on the Thailand's paramilitary border guards in press with White Lotus in Bangkok.

Professor David Horner continued work on his study of General Sir John Wilton, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee in the Vietnam War, and in December forwarded the manuscript to the publisher. In July he presented a paper, 'Strategy and Generalship: Strategic and Operational Planning for the 1943 Offensives' at the Chief of Army's history conference. During the period he attended major conferences organised by each of the three Services.

Dr Alan Dupont's research in 2003 focused on Australian defence issues, Indonesia and intelligence trends. He produced a major critique of existing defence strategy in *The Australian Journal of International Affairs* ('Transformation or Stagnation: Rethinking Australian Defence', vol.57, no.1, April 2003, pp.55-76) and an article on Australia-Indonesia relations looking at links with the Indonesian Special Forces (KOPASSUS). This was produced in the journal *Agenda* ('The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia Re-engage?') with a briefer version appearing in *The Diplomat*. An important study of changes in intelligence collection and assessment appeared as the lead article in a special edition of *Intelligence and National Security* ('Intelligence for the 21st Century', vol.18, no.4, Winter, 2003, pp.5-21).

In addition to these journal articles, Dr Dupont gave a presentation entitled 'Will there be Water Wars?' to the Conference on Water Security and Conflict in the 21st Century, an initiative of the ANU's National Institute for the Environment, National Institute for Asia and the Pacific and AusAID, Canberra, 19-20 August 2003, which was later published in the Institute's journal.

In addition to his commitments in coordinating the overall academic program of the expanding GSSD program, **Dr Robert Ayson** taught a new 'Strategic Concepts' elective in Canberra and then in Tokyo (at United Nations University) and Taipei (at National Chengchi University). He also worked with applicants for PhD studies with the SDSC and scholarships to support this study. In October 2003 Dr Ayson spoke on the prospects for military action against North Korea at a seminar and conference organised by Taiwan's National Defense University (based on a collaborative project with the SDSC's Dr Brendan Taylor). He completed revisions on a New Zealand chapter for an edited book on cosmopolitan militaries to be published by Manchester University Press in 2004. Dr Ayson had short articles published on the Solomons intervention in *The Diplomat* and *Australian Financial Review*.

Over the course of the past six months, **Dr Brendan Taylor** has:

- Continued to play an active role in the GSSD and the Undergraduate Strategic Studies Programs. While tutoring throughout the semester in the former, a highlight for him in the latter was a lecture he gave to a new course, entitled 'Strategic Concepts', on the topic 'Alliances in theory and practice.'
- Provided commentary on the continuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, including a radio interview with Voice of America and an article in *The Diplomat*. Dr Taylor has also co-authored a longer piece with Dr Robert Ayson on this subject, which is currently under review with a major American journal.
- Under the guidance of Professor Ross Babbage and in tandem with PhD candidate Mr Marc Ablong, undertaken administrative responsibilities for the Defence Transformation Options Project, a series of workshops which the Centre is running to consider options for the Australian Defence system fifteen years hence.

Dr Coral Bell's new book *A World Out Of Balance: American Paramourncy and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century* is about to be published. It is an account of how the world works in the absence of a central balance of power: that is, the current unipolar world of US ascendancy. It looks at why this phase of diplomatic history has occurred, how long it can be expected to last, and what it means for crisis-management and strategy on issues like Iraq. She has now moved on to a shorter study called *Alliances and War*.

Dr Ron Huisken focused particularly on Asia Pacific issues including Sino-US relations, the crisis in North Korea, the issue of the US military 'footprint' in the region, and the economic consequences of terrorism. He has continued his analysis of US management of unipolarity. Other enduring interests include enhancing multilateral security processes, ANZUS, and the evolution of Australian defence policy.

During 2003 **Mr Clive Williams'** main activity was running Masters course electives and other courses on 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism' in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, San Diego, Taipei and Tokyo. He also presented papers at major conferences in Canberra, Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, Sydney, Brisbane, Singapore and Ottawa.

Mr Williams will focus on the following activities in 2004:

- Further research into international terrorism — with particular reference to Southeast Asia.
- Continuing development and delivery of the 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism' and newly introduced 'Security in Business and Government' electives — both in Australia and overseas.
- Ongoing national and international commentary on contemporary terrorism issues.

Mr John McFarlane continues his duties as Executive Director of the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (AUS-CSCAP) as well as undertaking research, delivering talks and participating in conferences relating to trans-national organised crime, links between crime and terrorism, terrorist financing, corruption, military support for law enforcement, homeland security, police peace operations and police intervention in

failing states. He has travelled extensively, speaking at international conferences on these topics, and also consults regularly with such authorities as the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Defence Force Academy (where he is a Visiting Fellow).

Mr Marc Ablong is currently a doctoral student concentrating on Revolutionary Concepts in National Security. This research will look beyond the Revolution in Military Affairs to the Revolution in National Affairs that is becoming more relevant in the 21st century security environment. After a career in private enterprise, Mr Ablong joined the Australian Department of Defence, where he worked consistently at the strategic level within the Australian Defence Headquarters and related areas, specialising in strategic policy, whole-of-nation concepts and capability development. His many positions have had a strong emphasis on the development of policies associated with national security and military strategy. He has prepared numerous analytical studies on future technological, organisational and doctrinal issues for the twenty first century military organisation, in both a single service (Navy and Air Force) and joint (Australian Defence Force) context.

Mr Bob Breen has been conducting research into the ADF military force projection in the 1990s with a focus on short notice deployments to Somalia in 1992, Bougainville in 1994 and 1997, and East Timor in 1999. He is also preparing a monograph *A Nation from the Ashes? The UN in East Timor 2000-2002*.

Mr Cameron Crouch joined the SDSC in June 2003 as a recipient of the Sir Arthur Tange PhD Scholarship award. He is focusing on how cognitive approaches can best be incorporated into the counter-terrorism campaign against al Qaeda. He is supervised by Professor Ross Babbage, Dr Robert Ayson and Mr Clive Williams. Mr Crouch holds a BA (Hons) and a MIRAP from the University of Queensland.

Mr Christian Enemark joined the SDSC as a PhD student in February 2003 on an Australian Postgraduate Award. He holds a BA (Hons) and LLB (Hons) from the University of Sydney.

Under the supervision of Dr Robert Ayson, Christian's thesis is tentatively entitled 'Disease Security in East Asia: Biological Weapons and Natural Plagues'. In second semester 2003, he co-ordinated and tutored the undergraduate course 'Strategic and Security Studies — the Asian Region' for the Faculty of Asian Studies. Mr Enemark's first SDSC Working Paper, *Biological Weapons: An Overview of Threats and Responses*, was published in October 2003.

Mr Tamotsu Fukuda continues to work towards his doctorate degree on security cooperation in East Asia. He is supervised by Professor Desmond Ball, Professor Paul Dibb and Dr Alan Dupont. He holds a BA (Hons) from the University of Cincinnati, US and a MA from the International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo.

Mr Christopher Michaelsen joined the SDSC as a PhD scholar in 2003. His current research focuses on Germany's, Japan's and Australia's war on terrorism. Analysing counter-measures taken to combat terrorism in Germany and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in reaction to the events of 9/11 (including Australia), Mr Michaelsen examines whether and to what extent responses were consistent with liberal democracy's obligation to respect civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Key questions of his research project include: How should liberal democracies respond to the 'new' terrorism? Is the threat from Islamic-fundamentalist terrorism comparable to previous forms of terrorism (eg nationalist/ideological terrorism in the 1970-80s)? Is there an alternative response to the threat from international terrorism that is effective and avoids curtailing civil liberties and human rights?

Ms Anna Powles joined the SDSC in May 2003 as a recipient of the Sir Arthur Tange PhD Scholarship award. Her thesis is titled 'The 'New' Intervention and the Shaping of Pacific Security' and explores the Australian Government's current doctrine of cooperative intervention in the Solomon Islands, the legitimacy and implications of the policy for the broader Pacific, and alternative Pacific orthodoxies on security and intervention. She undertook fieldwork in Suva, Fiji, in 2003 and will be travelling to the Solomons Islands, Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu in 2004. She is supervised by Dr Robert Ayson, SDSC, and Mr Greg Fry, Department of International Relations, ANU.

SDSC STAFF

AND THEIR RESEARCH INTERESTS

Professor and Head of Centre

R Babbage, BEc, MEc(Syd), PhD(ANU)
*Australian defence issues, force structure
development issues and economic security,*
Phone: 6125 9926
Email: rbabbage@connect.net.au

Special Professor

DJ Ball, BEc, PhD(ANU), FASSA
*Australian security, intelligence, nuclear and
strategic issues, regional cooperation*
Phone: 6125 9922
Email: desmond.ball@anu.edu.au

Professor and Chairman of Advisory Council

P Dibb, AM, BA(Nott), PhD(ANU)
*Australian defence policy, regional security,
alliance relationships*
Phone: 6125 9921
Email: paul.dibb@anu.edu.au

Senior Fellow (on extended leave)

A Dupont, BA(UNSW), MA, PhD(ANU)
Southeast Asia and regional security
Phone: 6125 9929
Email: alan.dupont@anu.edu.au

Professor

DM Horner, DipMilStud (RMC), MA(UNSW),
PhD(ANU)
*Australian defence history, concepts for land
operations*
Phone: 6125 9933
Email: david.horner@anu.edu.au

Post-doctoral Fellow

B Taylor, BSocSc(Waikato), MA, PhD(ANU)
*North Korea, US Foreign Policy (in Asia only),
Economic statecraft/sanctions*
Phone: 6125 9928
Email: brendan.taylor@anu.edu.au

Research Assistant

M Thatcher, MA(Hons)(Waikato)
Phone: 6125 9931
Email: meredith.thatcher@anu.edu.au

Graduate Studies In Strategy And Defence

R Ayson, BSocSc(Waikato), MA(ANU), PhD(Lond)
*Strategic concepts and Asia-Pacific security, New
Zealand defence policy*
Phone: 6125 9923
Email: robert.ayson@anu.edu.au

Visiting Fellows

Brigadier S Ayling, AM, BSc (Physics)(NSW), BSc
(War Studies)(University of Baluchistan)
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Admiral C Barrie, AC, RANR
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Dr CM Bell, BA(Syd), MSc(Econ), PhD(London),
FASSA
*Central balance of power, crisis management, US
foreign policy*
Phone: 6125 9921
Email: anne.dowling@anu.edu.au

Dr R Brabin-Smith, AO, BSc, PhD(Nott)
Australian and regional defence security policy
Phone: 6125 9932
Email: richard.brabin-smith@anu.edu.au

Dr R Huisken, BEc (Hons)(UWA), MSs(Stockholm),
PhD(ANU)
*Ballistic missile defence, alliance issues, West
Asian security mechanisms.*
Phone: 6125 9938
Email: ron.huisken@anu.edu.au

Commodore J McCaffrie RANR, BA(Qld), MA(ANU)
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Adjunct Professor R O'Neill, AO, BE(Melb), MA,
DPhil(Oxon), DLitt(ANU), FASSA, FRHS
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Dr A Stephens, BA, LittB (History)(UNE),
MA(ANU), PhD(NSW)
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Mr R Thomas
Phone: 6125 9921; Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Mr C Williams, MG, BA(Hons), MA(Hons)(Melb)
Terrorism
Phone: 6125 9936
Email: clive.williams@anu.edu.au

AUS-CSCAP Executive Director

J McFarlane, BA(Monash)
*Transnational crime, terrorism, corruption, police
peace operations, military support for law
enforcement and homeland security.*
Phone: 6125 9979
Email: john.mcfarlane@anu.edu.au

Executive Officer

A Haese

CONTACT US

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Building 6, Fellows Road
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200 Australia

Telephone: +61 (0)2 6125 9921
Facsimile: +61 (0)2 6248 0816
E-mail: sdsc@anu.edu.au
Home page: <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/>

Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence

Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence
Building 6, Fellows Road
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia

Telephone: +61 (0) 2 6125 9924
Facsimile: +61 (0) 2 6125 6642
Email: gssd.administrator@anu.edu.au &
robert.ayson@anu.edu.au
Home page: <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/gssd/>

49th — Top 500 World Universities



3rd — Top 100 Asian/Pacific Universities

The Australian National University was recently honoured with the above placings in the *Academic Ranking of World Universities – 2003* published by **Shanghai Jiao Tong University** on 12 December 2003.