


# SDSC NEWSLETTER

STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE  
RESEARCH SCHOOL OF PACIFIC AND ASIAN STUDIES · THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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## MESSAGE FROM THE NEW HEAD



As this is my first message to the readership of the SDSC Newsletter as Head of the Centre, let me take this opportunity to thank all of those who have expressed their congratulations and good wishes. It is wonderful to see the depth and breadth of the Centre's support.

I am delighted to advise that my predecessor as Head of the Centre, Professor Paul Dibb, retains an integral role in the Centre's life. Paul continues on as a full professor in the Centre and has kindly agreed to Chair the new SDSC Advisory Council that is scheduled to be established later this year.

I have taken up the Headship of SDSC at a time when the need for advanced scholarship and research on strategic and defence issues has never been more pressing. At the global level, key issues include the management of international security in a uni-polar environment, the challenges posed by the new forms of 'macro-terrorism', options for restraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their primary means of delivery and the wide range of security demands that are arising from the pressures of globalisation. In the Asia-Pacific region we face particular challenges in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, in ongoing instability across the archipelago screen to the north of Australia and in the Southwest Pacific in successfully developing fully-functioning national institutions and systems of governance. Australia's national defence planning is also confronting major challenges of reform to make the most of the opportunities offered by highly networked operations, new operational concepts and the vast potential offered by innovative whole-of-nation arrangements. The research agenda before us is both rich and urgent.

One way of building the region's capabilities to address these and related important issues is to educate and network a new generation of strategic leaders across the Asia-Pacific. An important start was made last year with the launch of both

the undergraduate course in Strategic and Security Studies — The Asian Region within the Faculty of Asian Studies and the new Masters Degree Program in Strategy and Defence. Both of these initiatives have been great successes with undergraduate numbers now at 74 and Masters Degree numbers at 70. Later this year our first offshore nodes for the Masters program will commence operations in Tokyo and Taipei and we are rapidly advancing arrangements for others in Bangkok, Washington DC, London, New Delhi and Melbourne. By next year we expect to be able to offer students the option of undertaking up to half of their coursework in each of these locations and student numbers in the Masters program are expected to exceed 100.

I am delighted to advise that it has been possible recently to raise the number of our PhD students to five. We are particularly grateful, in this context, to the Australian Department of Defence for funding two new Sir Arthur Tange doctoral scholarships. Later this year we plan to launch a completely new professional doctorate program in strategy and defence that will be designed to educate and network the most gifted next-generation strategic leaders from across the Asia-Pacific region. We anticipate that this will see the number of SDSC's PhD students rise rapidly in coming years.

The recent conflict in Iraq provided SDSC with an opportunity to deliver expert briefing to the media on a seven-days-a-week morning schedule. This proved very successful and attracted widespread acclaim. I am very grateful not only to Alan Dupont, Desmond Ball, Paul Dibb, Ron Huisken, Coral Bell, David Horner, Clive Williams, Robert Ayson, Brendan Taylor, Meredith Thatcher and other SDSC colleagues who contributed, but also to AVM Ray Funnell, Professor William Maley, Professor Amin Saikal and other external experts who generously contributed their insights and their time.

In many respects the Iraq crisis briefings are a model for many of our other pending initiatives, in that we not only plan to engage our own staff and our rapidly-growing student body, but we also plan to involve, on a part-time basis, a wide range of recently-retired but highly skilled former officials and defence force personnel. These new initiatives will take a





*Iraq Briefing – Thursday, 3 April 2003.  
Left to Right: Desmond Ball, Ron Huisken and Ray Funnell.*

variety of forms, but they are all designed to progress key elements of our research and teaching agenda by bringing a broader range of high quality minds to bear. My colleagues and I plan to advise a range of specific opportunities in coming months that may be of particular interest to friends of the SDSC. There will be key aspects of the Centre's research and teaching programs in which many readers of this newsletter will be welcome to play active roles. We look forward very much to seeing more of you in and around the Centre.

One way of keeping up-to-speed with the accelerating pace of activities at SDSC will be to touch base periodically with the SDSC web site: <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc/> This web site is about to be updated and expanded markedly and I encourage you to make increased use of it to read the latest news and pass us your thoughts and suggestions.

With best wishes,

Ross Babbage  
Head SDSC

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## A WORLD DIVIDED

PROFESSOR PAUL DIBB, *Weekend Australian*, 22–23 March 2003

The war in Iraq heralds the coming of a new world order. The issue here is not the war and its military outcome but the implications for how the world should be run. The United States is bitterly disappointed with the United Nations and the failure of major powers — particularly France and Germany but also Russia and China — to support its invasion of Iraq. We are now going to see a dramatic shift in the international system between those who identify themselves with Washington's intention to change the international order, including by military pre-emption if necessary, and others who are determined to resist what they see as US hegemony.

How did we get to this desperate situation when only a decade ago statesmen were talking about a new era of peace and multipolar co-operation, as distinct from the dangerous bipolar confrontation that existed between the US and the Soviet Union? The fact is that a multipolar world is much more unstable and competitive — as we have now seen — than the more clearly demarcated bipolar world of the Cold War. The other new factor here is the intense feeling of anger and humiliation in Washington after September 11. The US fully intends to eliminate the terrorist threat, even if that takes many years. More contentiously it will pursue regime change, if necessary through the use of military force, in the 'axis of evil' countries (Iraq, North Korea and Iran). And it wants to change the geopolitics of the Middle East.

The problem is that not all countries, and not even all democratic countries, will agree with the US about how the world should be run. As Henry Kissinger wrote in his book about the balance of power in 19th century Europe: 'Whenever there exists a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it is not the adjustment of differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself.'

The distinguishing feature of such a power is that nothing can reassure it, except absolute security through the neutralisation of its opponents. Kissinger went on to argue that diplomacy cannot function in such an environment. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language. Diplomatic conferences are occupied with sterile repetitions of basic positions and accusations of bad faith. How familiar is that today?

Washington has seen the international community swing from one extreme to the other in the 18 months since September 11. Immediately after those terrorist attacks on the US most of the world promised unstinting support to Washington in its war on terror. We now have a world in which some major powers are aligning themselves against what they see as the rise of unilateral US power. If events are

not handled skilfully, this trend will indeed divide the world. This will be more so if there are pre-emptive US military attacks on North Korea and Iran.

What we are seeing here is classical Realpolitik. The dominance of US power may bring about a new equilibrium of forces. Again as Kissinger has noted, whatever else a revolutionary power may achieve, it tends to erode, if not the legitimacy of the international order, at least the restraint with which such an order operates. This is not to suggest on my part that the US has become an expansionist imperial power. Rather, it is to observe — as Tony Blair has said: ‘The problem people have with the US — not the rabid anti-Americans but the average middle ground — is not that, for example, they oppose them on WMD or international terrorism. People listen to the US on these issues and may well agree with them; but they want the US to listen back’.

But the US is not in a listening mood. It is a power without parallel in world history. And it is unlikely to face a peer competitor, or even a combination of hostile powers, in the foreseeable future. The US accounts for 32 percent of world GDP and more than 43 percent of world military expenditures. It spends more than \$US 1 billion a day on defence. It dominates more than half of global military production and almost 60 percent of world military R&D spending. Since September 11, the international system has had to adjust to an America that is more unilateralist, more interventionist and more inclined to use military force and, indeed, more demanding of what it expects from its allies.

The crucial security question for Australia is: will band wagoning with the US in a coalition of like-minded states become the defining security architecture of the future? Or will there be an increase in strains and tensions between an increasingly demanding US and the resentment of other major powers? What we have now is not only tension between the US and Europe but the simmering resentment of Russia and China. Even the inner US alliance circle is unravelling. Canada does not support this war on Iraq and the fighting is only being done by the US, Britain and Australia.

As Owen Harries has remarked, the danger in all of this is not of a hostile military response to the US. It is rather of ‘a gathering political hostility which leaves America both dominant and increasingly disliked and isolated’.

So, we have now entered a highly risky new strategic era. And yet there is no evidence that Canberra understands the implications of the course on which we are now embarked. Instead, we get the surreal pronouncements in the Government’s Foreign Policy White Paper and its Defence Update document (both of which were released only last month) that ‘relations between the major powers are now more stable than they have been for many years’ and that the focus of the major powers is ‘on cooperating to advance shared interests’. A more likely outcome is of a world divided and a return to the essentially tragic history of international affairs.

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# THE DIPLOMATIC IMPACTS OF THE IRAQ CRISIS

DR CORAL BELL, Interview given at SDSC Media Briefing April 2003

The rapid military success of the coalition troops in the war in Iraq was fore-ordained by the existing balance of forces. The only uncertainties were how long it would take, and how heavy the casualties would be. On both those accounts, the more optimistic of the analysts have been justified. If the occupation goes well, and a stable as well as benign new government can be erected soon in Baghdad, even the war-protestors (or some of them) may be moved to reconsider their views, especially given the obvious joy of many Iraqis at the demolition of Saddam’s regime.

Yet even so the diplomatic crisis which preceded the military campaign should not be forgotten. Only eighteen months before the launching of the war, back in early September 2001, the US, as the paramount power of a unipolar world seemed to face no foreseeable challenge. Then one came out of a blue morning sky, on ‘9/11’. But that challenge was not

from another sovereign state, or alliance of states, it was from a ‘non-state actor’, al-Qaeda, and for three months or so, it seemed actually to reinforce the existing pattern of diplomatic alignments.

Indeed, US diplomatic influence grew. Even the French had a headline, ‘We are all Americans now’. President Putin suddenly became one of President Bush’s closest buddies, very helpful on US bases in Central Asia, and other issues. China, which had earlier that year seemed on a potential collision course with the US, shelved its grievances and anxieties for the time being. NATO invoked its famous Article 5 for the very first time: ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. Pakistan suddenly became a vital strategic partner. India, despite that, got onto better terms with Washington than even before. The US was suddenly a powerful influence in Central Asia, where it had hardly been present before. Even countries like

Yemen, Somalia or the Sudan, which had previously been seen as possible alternative sanctuaries for al-Qaeda (after Afghanistan) were suddenly anxious to co-operate, even with the CIA.

It could not last. From that high-point at the end of 2001, the US diplomatic trajectory was downwards, first in a slow decline, and then in a sudden fall. Its nadir was in mid-March 2003, when a second UN resolution authorizing war on Iraq could not be certain even of the votes of Security Council members like Guinea, Cameroon and Angola, and was certain of a French veto. Only four months earlier, on 8 November, the previous resolution, 1441, had passed unanimously, even Syria going along with putting Saddam 'on notice'.

So what went wrong in those four months? Basically, Washington's crisis-management, though not the State Department's role in it. Stronger voices intervened, from the White House and the Pentagon.

Diplomatic crises, such as that with Iraq, are almost always managed by a mix of operational and declaratory signals, not only between the main adversaries, but from interested allies and bystanders. Operational signals are things actually done, like moving a large body of American and British troops (and a handful of Australians) to the border of Iraq. That worked fine: even the French conceded that it was the reason Saddam had gone some way, by January 2003, towards disarmament.

The trouble was with the declaratory signals: essentially just words said or published, and 'secret' memoranda or plans or discussions carefully leaked to authoritative papers like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. By the end of 2002, they had not only created a worldwide stage army of protestors but alienated many governments, including those with votes or vetoes on the Security Council.

It all began with Bush's 'axis of evil' speech in January 2002. That phrase no doubt seemed neat to the speechwriter: a 'quotable quote', as they say in the US media, raising echoes of the Reagan's 'evil empire'. But diplomatically it was disastrous. Not only because it seems to have confirmed North Korea, Iran and perhaps others like Syria in an assumption that a nuclear deterrent of their own might be the best insurance against forced regime change, but because it confirmed in other countries the already prevalent image of Bush as just a trigger-happy cowboy, out of his depth in international politics. Other phrases like 'dead or alive' enhanced that image.

Given his past business connections, and apparent enthusiasm for war, Dick Cheney's speeches were bound to add a more sinister undertone to that image, creating an almost universal assumption among the street protestors that it must really be a 'war for oil'.

More damaging still were the almost daily television statements of Donald Rumsfeld, with their blend of radical concepts like 'pre-emption' (in the case of Iraq actually a euphemism for preventive war) and an apparent doubt about the usefulness of America's alliances in the contemporary mode of American war. Quite a departure from the 'collective defence' assumption behind NATO. One long-enthusiastic ally of the US in that organization, Turkey, promptly proved how awkward a disaffected ally can be, throwing US strategy off-balance, at least for a while, by refusing passage for the US 4th Division which had been due to enter Iraq from the north, and move down towards Baghdad.

The Rumsfeld principle — the mission determines the coalition, not the coalition the mission — is known around Washington as 'diplomacy by posse'. In a posse, by tradition, the sheriff decides what members will be useful, and what method will be chosen for 'going after the bad guys'.

Those Western icons — from 'High Noon' and 'Shane' — are deeply embedded in US popular culture. The underlying theme of them all is redemptive violence: the lone warrior, deserted by his usual allies (or most of them) redeeming the townsfolk by his efficiency in disposing of the existing menace. But it did not go over well with the French or Germans, still less with Islamic societies, where images of the past are more oriented to the colonial period. And who feared it was being re-created.

That 'image problem' was reinforced by a more substantial uncertainty. Until February 2003, it was not clear whether President Bush would be content with disarmament (which many governments thought was beginning by then) or would not be satisfied with anything less than 'regime change'. The difference between those two objectives was crucial. Short of a coup by the Iraqi generals, regime change would necessitate war. Disarmament could be achieved without war, or so many governments (though not Bush) believed. By late 2002 it was also widely understood that regime change in Iraq was by no means the ultimate ambition of one very influential pressure-group in Washington. For them 'the new Iraq' was just the entering wedge to produce in time 'a New Middle East' with the existing assortment of more-or-less autocratic regimes transformed by future pressures (not necessarily war) into democracies ready to live in peace with Israel.

No one could quarrel with that neo-conservative vision (or mirage?) as a pleasant Utopian ambition for the future of the area. But as an actual immediate prospect to be put in hand in 2003, it raised pervasive doubt and alarm.

To my mind, that was probably the main cause for the mass desertion of the US camp in the four months between the unanimous resolution of early November 2002, and the failed resolution of early March 2003. By then many non-Americans shared a sentiment crystallized by Shakespeare long ago:

*O, it is excellent  
To have a giant's strength.  
But it is tyrannous  
To use it as a giant.*

Militarily, economically and even culturally the US had, and has, a giant's strength. But at that point UN diplomacy was used to send Washington a message: more than a few governments saw it as tyrannous to use it for regime change ad lib, no matter how changeworthy the targeted regimes are. Nationalism and Islamic resentment of 'infidels' in Muslim lands must be borne in mind.

That moment in March remains more important than it may now seem. The unipolar world, and America's paramourcy in it, rests on two pillars. The first is the US's own strength, militarily and economically. The second is the willingness of a very large proportion of the society of states to 'bandwagon' with it. That willingness, in turn, has depended on an assumption that American policies and purposes are reasonable and prudent, an assumption which was heavily eroded for many important governments in the four months between the November resolution and the launching of the war in March.

The really whole-hearted unilateralists in Washington may believe that diplomatic support does not matter much in the new kind of global conflict that began on '9/11'. But it does. Global co-operation was largely responsible for the most vital single success in the 'war on terror': the police and intelligence co-operation all over the world which has disrupted the worldwide network of jihadist cells in so many countries, cells which were the real basis of bin Laden's power to do harm. The flow of funds has been diminished, and the experienced jihadists who learnt their trade in Afghanistan are mostly out of action, in Guantanamo Bay, or in the caves on the Pakistani border, or dead.

Matters will undoubtedly be patched up in the Western alliance: it is still very important to all its members. If the rapid military success in Iraq produces a constructive and above all short occupation, it will overlay the memory of the disputes of early 2003.

But anti-Americanism has been again for a time the most fashionable form of radicalism, blending into itself all the grievances of the disadvantaged and the dispossessed. That also will pass, as it did after Vietnam. Nevertheless, the first stirring of a wind of change in the general climate of international relations has been apparent. For a time, France, Russia, China, Germany, Turkey, the entire Arab world, most of the Third World, much even of Europe and Latin America, were dubious about, or alienated from, American military, diplomatic and political purposes. From its beginnings more

than a century ago, in 1898, America's rise to world power had never encountered what most potential hegemonal powers have encountered: a balance of power coalition against it. No longer is it so difficult to imagine one: we have seen a first faint cloudy foreshadowing of its possible shape.

In an odd sort of way, the rising anxieties about US unilateralism suddenly raised also the importance of the Security Council. Why did so many governments, and some of the protestors, say vehemently 'No war without a new UN resolution?'. Not many people had given that kind of priority to a vote in the UN before. The campaign in Kosovo in 1999 had been launched without a UN resolution because it was assumed Russia would veto. The norm of defence of human rights was assumed to override the legal niceties, and no one much protested except Milosevic and his defenders. Saddam had certainly committed more crimes against human rights in his 24 years in power, than Milosevic did in the campaign to expel the Kosovans. So why the difference? To my mind, because by then the UN had come to be seen, during the long run-up to the war, as a shield — the only shield — against US unilateralism, even though all it could do was deny Washington the legitimacy of a new resolution.

That denotes a new status for the UN, but also a new and serious danger to its future. President Chirac has made no secret of his ambition to turn the current unipolar world back into a multipolar one. He said so quite bluntly in an interview in *Time* (24 February 2003). Of course French presidents ever since De Gaulle have cherished ambitions to take the US down a peg or two. (He never forgave Washington for some snubs from Roosevelt during World War II.) But this time is different, because of the discovery that the UN could be used as a forum to turn a vague ambition into an actual strategy. Only a diplomatic strategy, of course. Any kind of military 'peer-competitor' is still well below the horizon of visibility, as the campaign in Iraq made clear.

But if real alienation sets in between the US and much of the rest of the world, the UN will become the main battlefield for the resulting diplomatic hostilities. And that will be more dangerous to the UN than to the US. It has already many enemies among the American electorate, some of whom see it as part of some vast conspiracy against their sovereignty. Some future Presidential hopeful, or a powerful majority leader in the Senate, could see that as a reason for Washington to turn its back on the organization, and adopt a really determined unilateralism, or even a 1930s-style isolationism. And we ought all to remember how the 1930s ended. Tony Blair seemed to be worried about that kind of possibility in his speech in the Commons just before the war began, speaking of his fear that diplomatic strife might affect the whole mode of US dealings with the world.

# WHAT IF SARS HAD BEEN A WEAPON?

## *Biological Security in the Asia-Pacific Region*

CHRISTIAN ENEMARK

The poor response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) by governments in the Asia-Pacific has underscored how ill-prepared and vulnerable the region is to mass outbreaks of deadly diseases, whether naturally occurring or deliberately inflicted. Nature is increasingly throwing up new diseases and deadlier versions of old ones. The biotechnology revolution, while racing to produce better medicines to fight this threat, also carries the potential for human-designed germs to be used as weapons of war. While effective biological arms control is unlikely to be achieved any time soon, governments can still afford their populations some protection by investing in protective equipment and emergency medical planning.

Despite rapid advances in medicine emerging from the biotechnology revolution, Nature remains the greater innovator when it comes to disease. Some scientists attribute the rise of new superdiseases to environmental changes. It is argued that land clearing and the leaking of chemicals and radioactive materials into the environment have released diseases previously contained by geography. In the case of known diseases, the widespread use of antibiotics (both for humans and animals) has gradually made them more resistant to treatment. The influenza virus, for example, continues to defy vaccination programs, striking back year after year in a new guise.

Some viruses have managed, through genetic mutation, to survive inside a new kind of host body. SARS appears to be caused primarily by a coronavirus, usually found in animals, which has jumped species to find a new home in humans.<sup>1</sup> One theory is that close proximity and cross pollution between humans and animals in southern China may have stimulated this phenomenon.<sup>2</sup> This is not unknown in that part of the world — in 1997, 18 people were infected by the Hong Kong bird ‘flu.’<sup>3</sup>

Just as a superdisease may be crafted by Nature, so too biological agents may be tailored for use as a weapon. Such know-how comes from our increasing familiarity with the genetic properties of humans and other organisms. In the case of viruses and bacteria, the aim of genetic tinkering is typically to increase a germ’s lethality or to make it attack the human body in a particular way. Scientists in the former Soviet Union’s biological warfare program employed emerging genetic engineering techniques to improve the resistance of plague bacteria to antibiotics. As the biotechnology revolution accelerates, it may also be possible to modify a benign microorganism so it produces a dangerous

toxin, or to create a germ that targets specific genetic characteristics in certain ethnic groups.<sup>4</sup>

Fortunately, the technology does not exist at present to genetically modify a virus like SARS so as to increase its kill rate, currently around 4 per cent. In any event, another virus — smallpox — already exists which poses a similarly high risk of person-to-person spread and whose kill rate is much higher, up to 35 per cent.<sup>5</sup> Although smallpox in humans was eradicated through a worldwide vaccination program, the virus lives on in laboratories around the world. In many cases it has been retained for ongoing research into biological warfare.

SARS may be regarded as a dress rehearsal for the nightmare of trying to contain an outbreak of smallpox that was deliberately released. It is now quite clear that countries in our region are woefully unprepared for a large-scale biological attack of this nature. The extent of damage from a chemical attack, or a biological attack using a non-contagious agent like anthrax, is necessarily finite. By contrast, it is the high risk of person-to-person spread posed by smallpox that makes containment so important. To this end, Australia has recently purchased 50,000 doses of smallpox vaccine. The United States plans to spend billions of dollars establishing its own large-scale vaccination program. But the price of medical defence is simply too great for many Asian governments, and they are gambling that the risk of a biological attack is too small to warrant expensive protective measures.<sup>6</sup>

Any risk assessment of this kind must take into account the high proportion of possible biological weapons proliferators within the Asia-Pacific, compared to other regions. India, Pakistan and Taiwan are suspected of having biological warfare research programs, and the Chinese, North Korean and Russian programs may have produced weapons ready for use.<sup>7</sup> North Korea may present the greatest danger, having possibly weaponised a number of pathogenic agents including smallpox.<sup>8</sup> In this context, North Korea’s ongoing links to international terrorism are particularly worrying.<sup>9</sup>

The risk of terrorism should not be overstated, however, as intent must be matched by capability. With all the ill will in the world, a terrorist group would still require vast finances and have access to sophisticated production and delivery equipment in order to execute a large-scale biological attack successfully. Even the wealthy Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, was not able to devise an effective biological weapon using

anthrax spores.<sup>10</sup> Without adequate technology, the risk of a deliberately inflicted outbreak of smallpox is likewise very low. However, it may only be a matter of time before a terrorist organization realises its dream of wielding a doomsday weapon. The question for governments is how to reduce and prepare for this danger.

The SARS outbreak demonstrated the enormous difficulties associated with containing a highly contagious disease. China has been roundly criticised for not advising the World Health Organisation sooner of the mystery virus which first appeared in Guangdong province last November. The subsequent spread of the disease beyond China starkly demonstrates the importance of communication for containment purposes. Close cooperation between national governments is also vital — after all, a virus is no respecter of borders.

As the SARS outbreak has become worse, the responses of countries in our region have become better. Australia is assessing incoming air passengers and has toughened up public health and quarantine laws to include involuntary detention of suspected SARS cases. In Malaysia, health authorities are threatening to imprison air passengers who fail to declare initial SARS symptoms such as fever and coughing. Hong Kong and Toronto are urgently setting up quarantined areas in an attempt to isolate the disease. And Japan is now drawing up emergency plans should SARS become a greater problem there. These are all sound measures that buy time until a cure is discovered.

There are lessons to be drawn also from experiences in treating SARS victims. In Hong Kong, there are fears that its hospitals will soon be filled to overflowing with SARS patients. Many of its front-line medical staff were among the earliest to succumb to the disease, thus exacerbating the problems of diagnosis, containment and treatment.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, if a deliberate biological attack were to hit a city, public health facilities would almost certainly be overwhelmed. In the face of a biological threat, it therefore makes sense for governments to have in place defensive measures beyond purely medical responses.

Effective defensive and protective measures to reduce the military utility of biological weapons are an important means of deterring or thwarting an aggressor. In the context of terrorist threats especially, the emphasis here should be on protecting concentrated civilian populations rather than military personnel. Tactical use of biological weapons is currently not a likely prospect, primarily because the time lag between delivery and effect reduces the utility of pathogenic agents in a fast-moving battlefield setting.

A strong civil defence package might include:

- technology for detecting whether a biological attack is underway, bearing in mind that many aerosolised agents are invisible, odourless and tasteless;
- stocks of antibiotics and other treatments for victims;
- vaccines, especially for first response personnel;

- protective equipment, clothing and shelters for containing the spread of infectious diseases;
- established plans for mass medical emergencies, coordinating hospital, transport and appropriate military personnel; and
- the drilling of city populations to reduce the likelihood of panic in the event of a real attack.

However much governments may take comfort in these tangible measures for biological defence, in the longer term the best hope for security against deliberate disease is comprehensive, verifiable and global biological arms control. This would greatly increase the risk of biological weapons proliferators being detected. It would also enhance the normative constraints that deem the use of such weapons to be politically unacceptable.

In 1975 the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) came into force as the international ban on the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Since then, BWC member states have been negotiating to devise a system for verifying compliance with the Convention's provisions. A draft BWC verification protocol has now been proposed that would require member states to declare all facilities within their territory capable of supporting a biological weapons program. These would then be subject to random inspections by an international team of experts. Also proposed for the verification regime was a provision for challenge inspections whereby a swift, unannounced visit could be made to a particular facility in a country suspected of breaching the BWC. Another proposal was for the mandatory and prompt investigation of suspicious disease outbreaks.<sup>12</sup> Had a BWC verification regime been in place last November, the appearance of a mysterious 'flu-like virus in southern China would almost certainly have triggered such an investigation.

The negotiations to strengthen the BWC were dealt a crushing blow in late 2001 when the United States decided, for security and commercial reasons, not to support an international system for verifying compliance with the Convention. For the present, this means the prospects for addressing the threat of biological weapons through arms control measures are bleak. In the meantime, countries in the Asia-Pacific region should take heed of the lessons from SARS. Whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberately inflicted, much of the necessary equipment and procedures for limiting harm and treating victims are the same.

An unwelcome preview of superdiseases to come, SARS has placed biological security back on the agenda for countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It is time for governments to fortify their populations more strongly against the dual enemies of Nature and human aggression.

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[http://www.opbw.org/lbi/docs/lbi\\_primer.pdf](http://www.opbw.org/lbi/docs/lbi_primer.pdf) (16 April 2003)

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## GRADUATE STUDIES PROGRAM: EXPANSION AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD) program entered its second year of operation with approximately 70 students enrolled in first semester courses (more than double the number from the same time last year). Students completed their studies in the two core courses (Strategic Studies and Key Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific) and Clive Williams' *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* course was offered as an elective option. The GSSD student body represented an increasing array of countries with students from Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States, and an increasing array of government departments and work backgrounds. The rich diversity is a major feature of the GSSD program and one of its key strengths. The program also welcomed students arriving in Canberra from Perth where a number had completed elective courses in the previous semester at Curtin University of Technology, and the first group of students who had completed undergraduate studies in strategy and security with the ANU's Faculty of Asian Studies.

Key features of the GSSD teaching program in semester 1, 2003, included:

- The range of expert presenters in the two core courses from the wider strategic studies community in Canberra, elsewhere in Australia, and beyond, including presentations by General Peter Cosgrove, Chief of the Australian Defence Force, Professor Ramesh Thakur, Vice-Rector, United Nations University, and Professor Harry Harding, Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
- The range of learning experiences, including the preparation of official submissions as well as essays, the

running of hypothetical exercises, and the opportunity for students to make oral presentations.

- The annual weekend away at the ANU's coastal property at Kioloa which included staff research presentations, a rolling seminar on the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and a hypothetical exercise as well as recreational activities.
- An active discussion list system alerting student to upcoming seminars around and off campus, relevant publications, and advice on assignments.

New developments include the signing of agreements with United Nations University in Tokyo and National Chengchi University in Taiwan. These will provide for the staging of GSSD courses at both prestigious universities. Students will be able to undertake up to half of their GSSD courses in either Tokyo and Taiwan, helping to fulfill the program's aim for a network of the next generation of strategic thinkers across the region. Negotiations are also underway for the establishment of similar arrangements with leading universities in other Australian, regional, and international centres.

New courses in preparation for the second half of 2003 include:

- Intelligence and Security (Ross Thomas)
- Security in Business and Government (Clive Williams and John McFarlane)
- Strategic Concepts (Robert Ayson)
- Courses run on Northeast Asian regional security issues by staff at United Nations University and National Chengchi University

# WORK IN PROGRESS

DR ROBERT AYSON continued to focus on the running of the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence program as it entered its second year of operation. In his capacity as Director of Studies, he contributed to:

- the welcoming and enrolment of new and returning students on the program;
- the coordination of the core Key Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific course;
- teaching in the other core course in semester 1: Strategic Studies;
- the teaching of the Faculty of Asian Studies' undergraduate strategy and security course;
- the establishment of tutorial support for GSSD students;
- managing the marking of GSSD assignments;
- putting arrangements in place for the delivery of courses in Tokyo (with United Nations University) and Taiwan (with National Chengchi University);
- making arrangements for the examination of the first set of research sub-theses undertaken by GSSD students in the MA (Strategic Studies);
- the running of the annual GSSD weekend away at the ANU's Kioloa coastal property;
- planning for second semester courses including the introduction of new elective options;
- the running of seminars by visiting presenters.

He has also been acting as a contact person in the SDSC for students wishing to undertake doctoral studies in the Centre including applicants for the Tange Defence PhD scholarships.

In early 2003 Dr Ayson completed revisions to a manuscript on Thomas Schelling's strategic thought (based on his doctoral dissertation), which is due for publication in late 2003. His publications in the first half of 2003 included:

- 'The death of geography?' (on Australia's Defence Update), *The Diplomat*, April-May 2003, pp. 14-15;
- 'Australia's defence and security challenges: a tale of three 'posts'', *New Zealand International Review*, 28:1 January-February 2003, pp. 5-7.

Dr Ayson also gave a presentation on Australia's alliances to the Australian Command and Staff College at Weston Creek.

PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE took up the position of Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre on 3 February 2003. Initial priorities have included the commencement of an informal review of the Centre's programs, processes and structures. The Centre's office

accommodation has been re-shuffled to make better use of the available space and, amongst other things, to free up a room that can be used for meetings with visitors to the Centre and for informal gatherings of Centre staff. Other developments are in process.

In its second year, ANU's Masters Degree Program in Strategy and Defence has grown to number some 70 students. During the first half of 2003 substantial progress was made in developing close partner relationships with several leading universities in delivering this program. New partnership agreements have now been finalized with the United Nations University in Tokyo and with the National Chengchi University in Taipei. Discussions are also well advanced with leading universities in Bangkok, New Delhi, London, Washington DC and Melbourne. Other partnership arrangements are in earlier stages of consideration in several other parts of the world. Our expectation is that from the second half of this year students entering our Masters Degree Program in Strategy and Defence will be able to complete up to half of their coursework requirements (through a combination of accredited local courses and ANU courses delivered locally) in many of these new locations.

The two-semester undergraduate course in Strategic and Security Studies within the Faculty of Asian Studies was also launched successfully for its second year. Some 74 students are currently enrolled in this course.

A major commitment during the February-April period was the conduct of the Strategic Studies program at the Australian Command and Staff College. This involved the planning, management and personal delivery of an intensive six-week strategic studies syllabus involving some 30 leading experts from different parts of Australia and overseas.

The above three major strategic studies teaching programs are making a substantial contribution to the education of a new generation of strategic thinkers in Australia and across the Asia-Pacific region.

Substantial progress was also made during this period on two major books that Ross Babbage is preparing with a small team of leading strategic analysts and practitioners. The first of these books, *Review of Military Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific Region — 2004* is designed to inform a wide audience not only about the general military capabilities that are held by the major countries in this region, but to provide assessments of the absolute and relative quality of the capabilities of these countries and their abilities to conduct various categories of military operation. The second volume: *Review of the Australian Defence Force's Capabilities — 2004*, takes a much closer look at the ADF's current and projected capabilities. Both of these books are expected to be published in coming months.

In late March, Ross Babbage traveled to London to attend a Council Meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and to further negotiations with a major university in the United Kingdom, with a view to establishing a partnership arrangement for ANU's Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence program. In late May, he traveled to Singapore to attend The Shangri-La Dialogue, the second annual meeting of Asia-Pacific Defence Ministers. In early June, he traveled to Kuala Lumpur to attend the annual ASEAN-ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable.

PROFESSOR DESMOND BALL is currently working in three principal areas — security issues in the Thailand-Burma borderlands, developments in Information Warfare capabilities and activities in the Asia-Pacific region, and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

With respect to the Thailand-Burma borderlands, Professor Ball visited the area on 13-25 January and 29-31 May. His book called *The Boys in Black: The Thahan Phran (Rangers), Thailand's Para-military Border Guards*, is currently in press with White Lotus Press in Bangkok. Professor Ball is currently completing two other books on aspects of human security in these borderlands.

Professor Ball has recently completed several papers dealing with various aspects of Information Warfare in the Asia Pacific region. In January, he presented a paper on 'China and Information Warfare: Signals Intelligence and Cyberwarfare', at a conference on *Asian and Chinese Security Issues in the Decade 2001-2011*, organized by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and held in New Delhi on 25-29 January. He also prepared a paper on 'Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New Technology' for a conference on *The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses*, co-organised by the Institute for Ocean Policy, Ship and Ocean Foundation (SOF), Tokyo, and the East-West Center, Hawaii, and held in Tokyo on 19-20 February. He has since been working with Richard Tanter on a study of radio surveillance in Japan.

With regard to regional security cooperation, Professor Ball has recently completed a paper on 'Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Track 1 and Track 2 Responses' for the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), project on *Searching for Peace in Asia and the Pacific*. On 22-26 April, Professor Ball visited Jakarta for discussions concerning proposed initiatives for regional cooperation with respect to counter-terrorism. On 1-6 June, Professor Ball attended the 17th Asia-Pacific Roundtable and the 19th Meeting of the Steering Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in Kuala Lumpur.

DR CORAL BELL has been mostly engaged on preparing for publication a book tentatively titled *American Power and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century: The Road Past*

*Baghdad*. She has also written an article called 'Iraq, Alliances and Crisis-Management' for the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, and two articles for *The Diplomat*, 'The Next Superpower' (February-March 2003) and 'The Old World Order' (April-May 2003). She has also taken part in the SDSC's media briefings during the Iraq war, and lectured to the Graduate Program in Strategy and Defence.

PROFESSOR PAUL DIBB devoted a considerable amount of his time in this period to the war in Iraq. He regularly contributed to the daily briefings organised by SDSC for the Australian media and he wrote six newspaper articles on the implications of the Iraq war for *The Australian*, *The Australian Financial Review* and *The International Herald Tribune*, as well as giving national television and radio interviews. He also wrote three articles about Australian defence policy.

Professor Dibb's major research activity was to complete his paper on *Australia's Alliance With America* for Melbourne University, which has been published and attracted considerable publicity. He is currently researching the concept of a new world order, which he has tentatively termed 'a world divided'.

In May, he attended the second Asia-Pacific meeting of regional Defence Ministers in Singapore. Professor Dibb has also been invited to attend the 2003 Australian Davos Connection Annual Leadership Retreat, which will discuss 'Creating a Future: Australia's Place in the World'.

Professor Dibb's other activities in this period included:

- chairing a conference in Melbourne on *Defence Innovation: Facing New Threats*;
- having discussions with the Director-General of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau of the Japanese Gaimusho;
- giving speeches to the Australian Business Economists group and the Australian Industry Group on the implications for the business world of Australia's new strategic environment;
- having discussions with major Australian financial institutions about geopolitical risk in the new world order;
- discussing possible contributions to the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessments on alternative futures in Asia;
- giving evidence before the defence subcommittee of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on Australia's maritime strategy;
- giving lectures to the ADF Command and Staff College;
- attending meetings of ASPI's research committee;
- providing advice to the Department of Defence on the rationalisation of defence industry;
- giving lectures to SDSC's Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence program;

- attending a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council with the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- giving evidence to the Kinnaird review of the Defence Materiel Organisation;
- giving a talk to the Defence Management Seminar on Australia's regional defence relationships;
- addressing the Department of Defence's Industry Division on the implications of Australia's changing strategic environment;
- having discussions with the Chinese Academy of Military Science;
- giving an address on Australian defence policy to the South Australian Press Club;
- attending a network centric warfare conference sponsored by the Department of Defence;
- giving a talk to the Asialink Australian-Asian New Leaders Program 2003;
- working on the establishment of an Advisory Council for the SDSC.

Professor Dibb's publications in this period included:

- *Does Asia Matter to Australia's Defence Policy?* (Canberra: ANU National Institute for Asia and the Pacific, November 2002), pp.16.
- *Australia's Alliance with America* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Asia Policy Papers, 2003).

DR ALAN DUPONT was heavily engaged in analysing and commenting on the conflict in Iraq and the North Korean nuclear crisis in the first half of 2003 as well as lecturing to the Australian Defence College and the Graduate Programme on Strategy and Defence. He organised and convened a daily briefing on Iraq for the Australian media in March and April which involved all members of the Centre as well as colleagues at the ANU, including from the Centre for International and Public Law, the Faculty of Asian Studies, the Economics Division in RSPAS and the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies.

Dr Dupont's other activities included:

- At the invitation of Canberra Grammar School, presenting a paper on *The Challenge of International Terrorism for Australia's National Security*, Canberra, 5 December;
- Attending Professor Ross Babbage's presentation entitled *New Terrorism — Implications for Asia Pacific Governance* to the Menzies Centre/ADI seminar series, Australian Security in the 21st Century on 11 December;
- Giving a presentation on *Security in Australia's Region* to the United Nation's Youth Association, Canberra on 12 December;

- Giving a seminar on the *North Korean Nuclear Crisis* at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada on 23 January;
- Briefing the Commander of Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters on *Regional Security Threats*, Victoria, British Columbia on 23 January;
- Delivering a lecture on the *New Security Agenda* to the Australian Defence College, Weston Creek on 6 February;
- Attending the biannual meeting of the Australian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Canberra, 12–13 February;
- At the invitation of the United Service Institution (ACT Branch) delivering a presentation on *Australia's Defence Strategy in the 21st Century*, Russell Offices, Department of Defence, 18 February;
- Giving evidence to the Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade at a public hearing on Australia's Maritime Strategy, Canberra, 26 February 2003;
- Visiting China for discussions on international security issues with the Chinese Foreign Ministry and government think tanks from 6–7 March;
- As a guest of the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry visiting Taipei for discussions on strategic developments in Northeast Asia, the Iraq Crisis and international terrorism from 9–16 March;
- Briefing a special sitting of the Government joint party room on the war in Iraq, Parliament House, 25 March;
- Attending a dinner hosted by the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, for the Commander of the East Timor Defence Force, Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, on 3 April;
- Attending the Second IISS Asia Security Conference (The Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore, 30 May–2 June.

Dr Dupont published several working papers and journal articles during this period. Among them were working papers on Kopassus and Australian Defence Strategy which were published as 'The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia Re-engage?' in the journal *Agenda* (vol.10, no.1, 2003) and 'Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defence Strategy', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, (vol 57, no. 1, April 2003). He also reviewed the book, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia* by Shaun Narine for the journal *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, (vol.25, no.1, April 2003) and wrote an article on Indonesia for *The Diplomat*.

MR CHRISTIAN ENEMARK joined the SDSC as a PhD scholar in February 2003. His area of research is the threat of biological weapons to security in the Asia-Pacific region. He is supervised by Professor Desmond Ball and Dr Robert

Ayson. Christian holds a BA(Hons) and LLB(Hons) from the University of Sydney.

MR TAMOTSU FUKUDA continues to work towards his PhD on multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region from a Japanese perspective. In the meantime, he conducts tutorials for Dr Robert Ayson of the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence and Dr Michael McKinley of the School of Social Sciences. He holds a BA(Hons) from the University of Cincinnati, US and a MA from the International Christian University in Tokyo.

PROFESSOR DAVID HORNER spent most of the period between January and mid-April working on his study of General Sir John Wilton, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee during the Vietnam War. He has now completed about three quarters of the manuscript. The study focuses particularly on the development of joint service arrangements in the 1960s. During February he delivered a series of lectures to the Australian Command and Staff College on Continental Strategy. As with other members of the Centre, he was heavily committed during March and April assisting the media with interviews and advice concerning the Iraq War.

In April, May and the first part of June he worked on an in-house study for the Department of Defence on a matter connected with the Iraq War.

During the six-month period, three books were published in the Army's military history series, of which he is editor. These were a history of the Citizen Military Forces from 1947 to 1974, a history of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit in the Second World War, and the memoirs of Brigadier Pat Beale, DSO, MC.

DR RON HUISKEN focused on Iraq and North Korea during this period. He completed an analysis of the Iraq crisis up to the adoption of Resolution 1441 in November 2002, addressed several community groups and responded to over 70 requests for interviews during the period January-April. He also published opinion pieces on Iraq and North Korea and briefed CSCAP on these issues. He lectured on US security policy and ANZUS to the Australian Defence College and to Masters students at the ANU and Curtin University in Western Australia. Dr Huisken is now completing his analysis of the Iraq crisis up to the start of hostilities on 20 March, and preparing a paper on weapons of mass destruction in the Asia-Pacific for a conference in Malaysia.

MR JOHN McFARLANE continues his duties as Executive Director of the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP). These duties included organising the 118th Meeting of AUS-CSCAP in Canberra on 12 and 13 February 2002, and editing and publishing AUS-CSCAP Newsletter No 15.

In addition:

- on 17 January, he participated in discussions with Professor Sheldon Simon of the University of Arizona about a US National Bureau of Research (NBR) research proposal 'Understanding and Countering Terrorist Influence in the Asia-Pacific Hemisphere';
- on 4 February and 21 March, he participated in discussions with senior officers from the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs about the preparation of a paper for the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on Human Smuggling and Associated Transnational Crime in Bali, Indonesia, from 28-30 April;
- together with Professor Tony Milner, Dean of Asian Studies, participated in discussions with three senior Australian Federal Police officers about an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant application on 'Security Concepts in the Asian Region and Australia' on 5 February;
- between 16 and 28 February, he participated in discussions on homeland security with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington; the Royal United Services Institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO.13) of the Metropolitan Police in London; and the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore;
- on 28 February, he delivered a lecture on transnational crime at the Australian Federal Police Management of Serious Crime (MOSC) Course No. 28 in Canberra. He subsequently reviewed and assessed the Strategic Crime Management Initiative proposals prepared by the 17 Australian and international students on the course;
- on 3 March, he accompanied Professor Tony Milner on discussions with Senator Robert Hill, Minister of Defence, on matters relating to AUS-CSCAP;
- on 12 and 20 March, he participated in discussions with senior officers of the Australian Federal Police on a possible crisis management seminar to be conducted by the AFP for senior officers of the Indonesian National Police;
- on 13 March, he organised a meeting between the Co-Chairs and Executive Director of AUS-CSCAP and officers from the International Security Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on matters of mutual concern;
- he delivered a paper on 'Policy Responses to terrorism in the Asia-Pacific' at the 12th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Wellington, New Zealand, between 8-10 April;
- together with Dr Sandy Gordon, he delivered a seminar on terrorist finance to an Australian Defence Force Academy postgraduate course at ADFA on 11 April;

- again, with Dr Sandy Gordon, he delivered a presentation on transnational crime to the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra on 17 April;
- between 22 and 26 April, he accompanied Professor Desmond Ball and Professor Tony Milner, Co-Chairs of AUS-CSCAP to Jakarta, Indonesia, for discussions with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies relating to our joint participation in the 4th CSCAP General Conference, due to be held in Indonesia in December;
- on 29 April, he delivered a Workshop on 'Porous Borders and Transnational Threats' at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies Senior Executive Course 2003-1 in Honolulu, Hawaii;
- between 27 April and 9 May, he reviewed and assessed the strategic policy papers submitted by the 21 Australian and international students attending the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Financial Crimes Investigation Management (FCIM) Course in Canberra;
- on 27 May, accompanied by Dr Sandy Gordon, delivered a presentation on 'Transnational Criminal Activities as a Security Challenge' to the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence Program at The Australian National University;
- between 1 and 6 June, he attended the 17th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, where he delivered a paper on 'Fighting Transnational Crime: Why the Poor Results?'. Following the Roundtable, he represented AUS-CSCAP at the 19th CSCAP Steering Committee meeting also held in Kuala Lumpur;
- between 10 and 12 June, he participated in the 9th Kanazawa Symposium on Northeast Asia, in Kanazawa, Japan, where he delivered a paper titled 'How to Combat Organised Crime';
- between 18 and 20 June, he participated in the Forum Regional Security Conference in Fiji.

On 24 March, Ms Andrea Haese commenced duties as Executive Officer of AUS-CSCAP, in support of the Executive Director.

DR BRENDAN TAYLOR joined SDSC as a Postdoctoral Fellow in December 2002. He will be working on issues of American foreign policy, alliance politics, economic statecraft, and Northeast Asian security. Consistent with these research interests, his duties and activities since joining the Centre have included:

- co-editing a Canberra paper with Mr Clive Williams, entitled 'Countering Terror: New Directions Post 911';
- publishing an article in the April issue of *The Diplomat*, addressing US policy toward North Korea;
- writing a daily briefing for SDSC staff and a daily SDSC press release outlining key developments during the course of the Iraq crisis;

- working with a team of more senior defence experts on an ASPI-commissioned review of Asia-Pacific military capabilities;
- delivering two lectures to the Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD) Program, addressing 'US approaches to regional security' and 'the economic instruments of national security';
- assisting the GSSD with the production of reading materials for its two core courses for 2003, advising students from the 2002 intake on their sub-thesis topics and other issues, and undertaking tutoring duties for the 2003 intake;
- continuing to revise his doctoral dissertation 'Economic Statecraft and the Sole Superpower: More State than Craft?' for publication.

MR CLIVE WILLIAMS' main activity has been giving presentations on terrorism and counterterrorism topics to a range of audiences. These have included:

- a presentation on 17 January to science teachers attending a refresher course at the ANU, on *Terrorist Use of Technology*;
- the presentation of a paper on *Terrorism Links* at an Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) workshop 'After-Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia', 27-28 January in Singapore;
- an after dinner talk on 6 February to Canberra North Rotary on *Iraq and Terrorism*;
- a presentation on 13 February to a CSCAP conference on the topic of *Regional Terrorism Developments*;
- a presentation on 14 February to College for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) on *Terrorism Threats to Australia*;
- a presentation on 17 February to American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) NSW Chapter on *Networks of Terror*
- presentations on 19 and 21 February to Australian Industry Group conferences in Melbourne and Brisbane on *Security Threats to Industry*;
- a presentation on 24 February to the Army Command and Staff College (AC&SC) on *Terrorist Schools of Strategic Thought*;
- a presentation on 25 February to RUSI NSW on *The Terrorist Threat to Australia and the Region*;
- a presentation on 27 February to the AC&SC on *Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare*;
- presentation of Masters Course elective *Terrorism and Counterterrorism* modules 11-13 March and 25-27 March;
- a presentation on 18 March to GSSD students on *Terrorist Schools of Strategic Thought*;

- a presentation on 24 March to Australian Protective Service (APS) Air Security Officers' course on *Aviation Security*;
- conducting, on 24 March, Australian Federal Police (AFP) workshop on *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*;
- attachment during 28 March to 26 May to the University of California International Relations Department as visiting lecturer on *Terrorism*;
- a presentation on 28 May to the Financial Crimes Summit 2003 on *Underground Banking, Hawala and Other Similar Remittance Systems, and Their Role in Terrorism Financing*;
- a presentation on 4 June to the Australian Society for Medical Research (ASMR) medical research week forum on *Prospects for Bioterrorism*;
- a presentation on 10 June to GSSD students on *Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare*;
- participation on 11 June in an Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) panel on *Extremism in Southeast Asia*;
- a presentation on 19 June to Emergency Management Conference on *Post-Bali Emergency Management*;
- a presentation on 30 June to the Australian Medical Association (AMA) Annual Conference, on *Prospects for Macroterrorism*.

Presentations given to some official audiences are not included above.

#### Publications

- Editing with Dr Brendan Taylor, and contribution of a chapter to, a *Canberra Paper* titled *Countering Terror: New Directions Post '911* SDSC 2003 with updated contributions from the SDSC 'Post-11 September: New Directions' Conference held on 11 September 2002.
- Contribution of a chapter titled *Doctrine Training and Combat with 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment* in *The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1962–1972*, Eds Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, Army History Unit, 2002 (released 2003).
- Numerous Op Ed articles on terrorism topics for major newspapers and magazines.
- Interviews with journalists for articles on terrorism and on the terrorism program at the SDSC.
- The AIIA noted in February 2003 that one of its most cited articles in 2002 was Clive Williams' *Australian Security Policy, Post 11 September* paper, published in the April 2002 edition of the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*.

## STAFF PROFILE: MEREDITH THATCHER



Meredith has been the research assistant and librarian at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre since July 2002.

After graduating with an MA(Hons) from Waikato University in 1989, she worked for a variety of law firms and comes to the Centre

from Ernst & Young Law in Auckland, New Zealand, where she was an executive assistant. Meredith has previously managed marketing and human resources, researched case law, maintained a law library, created newsletters/brochures, and designed a website.

For leisure, Meredith can be found tackling astronomy, calligraphy, cross-stitch, crosswords, or cryptography. Enjoying Canberra's fine weather since flying from the 'Land of the Long White Cloud', she has taken in the capital's sights by walking around the city and Lake Burnley Griffin. An avid trumper, she has also recently 'conquered' Mt Kosciuszko.

Given her diverse role at the Centre, Meredith looks forward to a long and rewarding association with The Australian National University.

Meredith welcomes enquiries from university staff or students, as well as non-ANU researchers, as to the Boeing Library's location, hours of operation, and publications held therein.

Contact Meredith on 6125 9931 or at [meredith.thatcher@anu.edu.au](mailto:meredith.thatcher@anu.edu.au).

Alternatively, visit Room 1.2, her door is always open.

# SDSC PUBLICATIONS

**Working Paper 371** Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = \$A8.80)

## *The Sydney Olympics: The Trouble-Free Games* by Clive Williams

This working paper looks at the security processes developed for, and the outcomes of, the 2000 Summer Olympic Games staged in Sydney. It reviews the coordination of various agencies and departments, a whole-of-government approach which, when underpinned by strong security risk management principles, proved vital to the success of the Games. The paper focuses on communications, secure venues, security policy issues and security concerns, border controls, sky marshals and firearms, emergency response and Defence support, anti-terrorism exercises, and overseas confidence-building measures. The paper shows that the 2000 Games served as a model for security procedures and processes. Together with new legislation such as the *Defence Aid to Civil Authorities Act*, it helped create in Australia a more sophisticated approach to the coordination of domestic national security policy at both official and Ministerial levels. This in turn assisted in the streamlined upgrading of national security measures following the 11 September attacks in the United States.

**Working Paper 372** Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = \$A8.80)

## *Iraq: (November 2001–November 2002). America's Checks and Balances Prevail Over Unilateralism* Ron Huisken

Between November 2001 and September 2002 the Bush administration tried to prepare the US, and the rest of the world, for pre-emptive military action to remove the Iraqi regime and bring that country into full and durable compliance with UN resolutions under a new, democratic government. It was a costly exercise. The US succeeded for a time in making itself, rather than Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the principal source of international concern. On 4 September 2002, President Bush abruptly changed course, committing his administration to achieving the same goal by the book, both domestically and internationally. What drove the administration down this path and sustained it as the political costs and risks mounted? Was the switch to the UN real or essentially cosmetic, only deferring slightly the intention to secure regime change?

**Working Paper 373** Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = \$A8.80)

## *The Kopassus Dilemma: Should Australia Re-engage?* Alan Dupont

The central argument of this Working Paper is that Australia must engage with the Indonesian Special Forces notwith-

standing its questionable human rights record. Tailored engagement with Kopassus is critical to Australia's regional counter terrorist strategy and to the long-term health of the Australia Indonesia relationship. However, we should also support reform of the Indonesian military as part of a broader agenda to entrench democracy and the rule of law in the archipelago.

**Working Paper 374** Cost \$A8.00 (+ GST = \$A8.80)

## *Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia's Defence* Alan Dupont

State on state conflicts are being replaced by hybrid wars and asymmetric conflicts in which there is no clear cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime and war. Given the enormous changes in Australia's security environment, it is time to rethink our defence strategy that has four major failings. It is based on a misplaced geographical determinism that ignores the diverse and globalised nature of modern conflict. It has shaped the Australian Defence Force for the wrong wars. It gives insufficient weight to the transnational threats that confront us. And it fails to recognise that modern defence forces must win the peace as well as the war. Australia needs a strategy for the future not the past and a transformed defence force structured for the very different security challenges of the 21st century.

**Canberra Paper 147** Cost \$A26.00 (+ GST = \$A28.60)

## *Countering Terror: New Directions Post '9/11'* Clive Williams and Brendan Taylor (Editors)

The essays in this book were originally presented as speeches to the SDSC conference 'Post 11 September — New Directions', held on 11 September 2002. They assess where counterterrorism efforts are, and should be, headed as a consequence of the attacks on the US homeland and the initiation of the 'war on terror'. Several interesting themes emerge, including the prospects for the American-led campaign against global terrorism, security threats in Southeast Asia, and the strategic implications for Australia.

Robert Cornall (Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney General's Department), Dr Grant Wardlaw (Executive Director of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence), Paul Dibb, Desmond Ball, Coral Bell, Ron Huisken, Clive Williams (All SDSC, ANU), Greg Fealy (Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU), John Funston (National Thai Studies Centre, Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU).

# SDSC STAFF AND THEIR RESEARCH INTERESTS

## Professor and Head of Centre

R Babbage, BEc, MEc,(Syd), PhD(ANU)

*Australian defence issues, force structure development issues, economic security*

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## Special Professor

DJ Ball, BEc, PhD(ANU), FASSA

*Australian security, intelligence, nuclear and strategic issues, regional cooperation*

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