New Zealand in the Bougainville Peace Process
by
Nigel Moore (New
Zealand Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and former New Zealand
High Commissioner to PNG (1998 to April 2001), and former New
Zealand High Commissioner to Tonga)
Notes from an SSGM Seminar: 8 May 2001
·
Before leaving Wellington I spoke to the New
Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff about my visit to the ANU.
He supports idea of MFAT staff in the “field”
visiting the ANU from time to time to share ideas, perceptions
and information about the Pacific – a region going through a
difficult period of transition.
·
ANU could usefully invite Nick Hurley (Solomon
Islands) and Rob Taylor (Vanuatu).
Should also think about asking Heads of Mission serving
in Polynesia to visit Canberra.
·
In history and politics at least, nothing emerges
from a vacuum. The
current peace process in Bougainville (Burnham 1997) owes much
to earlier efforts to broker peace - i.e.
Endeavour Accords 1990; Honiara 1994; Arawa Conference
late 1994; and Cairns late 1995.
·
Should also acknowledge the contribution of key
individuals in the “pre-Burnham” period, notably Peter
Barter (Minister for Local and Provincial Government in Chan’s
administration), and Theodore Miriange (Bougainville Premier,
tragically assassinated in 1996).
·
Both worked tirelessly before Burnham to heal
divisions in Bougainville society and steer the island towards
the idea of a negotiated settlement with the National
Government in Port Moresby.
Their efforts helped set the scene for New Zealand’s -
and subsequently the region’s - peace efforts in Bougainville.
·
As for me, I became involved in Bougainville in
1996 when working in the Pacific Division, MFAT, Wellington.
·
The NZ Foreign Minister at that time, Don McKinnon,
felt very strongly that the region needed to do more to help end
the Bougainville conflict.
His concerns were:
o
humanitarian
(health, education, employment opportunities);
o
possible
impact on stability elsewhere in the region;
o
damage
to the PNG economy – loss of income from the mine etc.
·
New Zealand, therefore, opened up a dialogue with
Port Moresby:
o
Waigani
suggested NZ work with PNG to strengthen border control between
PNG and Solomon Islands;
o
NZ
were not overly keen on this approach - wanted Waigani to reopen
genuine negotiations
·
Significantly NZ recognised at this time the
importance of making direct contact with the BRA/BIG.
We followed that lead.
(Difference here with Australian policy of little or no
contact with BRA/BIG at that time).
·
In late 1996/early 1997 McKinnon made contact with
Martin Miriori, BIG, in The Hague.
Miriori was keen to see NZ involved, as were other
moderates in BRA/BIG, notably Sam Kauona and Joseph Kabui.
·
However, it was not clear what NZ (or our
colleagues in the region) might do.
·
Peter Barter attracted to idea of NZ providing
police to establish a “secure
zone” around Arawa to facilitate talks (similar to 1994 Arawa
Conference). Kabui personally attracted to this idea.
Other BRA/BIG wanted UN involvement.
We did not think the UN option would fly - ie Secretary
General’s expectation that the region would assume prime
responsibility for solving conflicts in the region.
·
Then in early in 1997 events took an unexpected
turn in PNG – as they do from time to time!
·
The Sandline Crisis (which came to a head in March
1997) was an attempt by Chan to use foreign mercenaries
(Executive Outcomes) to bring about military victory in
Bougainville. His
objectives were to;
o
crush
the separatist movement on Bougainville once and for all.
o
regain
some credibility following the Kangu Beach Massacre (12 security
force personnel killed, 5 taken hostage in September 1996); and
o
improve
his chances of being returned as Prime Minister in the mid-1997
general elections.
·
Chan subsequently told me that when he had became
Prime Minister in
August 1994, he had
worked hard to secure a negotiated settlement to the
Bougainville crisis. The failure of senior BRA/BIG leaders to
attend the Arawa meeting in late 1994 convinced him, however,
that the BRA/BIG was not serious about peace.
He felt betrayed and angry, and eventually turning to the
idea of mercenaries to win a quick military victory on the
island.
·
Instead of solving the Bougainville crisis, the
“Sandline incident” sparked a constitutional crisis
The military intervened….Parliament was
surrounded….Chan was forced to stand down as PM....and a few
months later he lost his parliamentary seat in the general
election. (Details
covered in good detail in Shaun Dorney’s book).
·
In retrospect it can be seen that Sandline gave a
much needed boost to the search for a political settlement on
Bougainville. (A
good example of the “law of unintended effect”)
·
Why was that?
o
The
National Government realised that the emotions/turbulence
generated by an on-going crisis on Bougainville might again
undermine the constitution, and
o
The
Bougainvilleans realised that when Waigani had its back to the
wall, it could adopt extreme measures.
·
In sum, Sandline brought both sides up sharp –
drove home the point to the National government and the
Bougainvilleans that a military solution was not possible.
A negotiated settlement was the only way forward.
In this sense, Sandline was a watershed.
·
Around this time, Don McKinnon sent John Hayes
(previous NZ High Commissioner to PNG) to Port Moresby to
explore possibilities for a renewed peace effort.
On his return to NZ, Hayes told me that he almost left
PNG without finding a useful role for NZ and the region.
But then, towards the end of visit he met Kapati Puaria
(legal officer) who suggested that a meeting of BRA/BIG and the
BTG leaders scheduled for Honiara be transferred to NZ.
·
The rest is history as they say.
·
The first Burnham meeting took place 5-18 July
1997. Preparations
for the meeting were not without drama; Hayes shot down in
Bougainville etc.
·
It was questionable whether the first Burnham
meeting would be a success – Bougainville factions were
reluctant to engage with each other, but eventually the ice
broken through:
o
‘time
out’ – shopping excursions ,
trips to the mountains/snow;
o
open-ended
time frame for talks (within
reason);
o
facilitation
role played by NZDF and MFAT, notably Hayes
·
Burhham I set the scene for the TMG (Truce
Monitoring Group, comprising NZ, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu)
and the establishment of a Bougainville Truce.
The following year (1998) an Irrevocable Peace was signed
between Bougainvillean factions and the National Government at
Lincoln, just outside Christchurch.
·
As for me – my bosses decided I should continue
working on Bougainville issues, but from Port Moresby not
Wellington. In
early August 1997 I packed my bags and went to PNG.
I stayed for nearly four years.
·
About a week after my arrival, Don McKinnon
arrived. A trip to
Bougainville was organised where Sam Kauona told McKinnon that
“Bougainville was not Cambodia” and that the “island’s
problems can be solved within
12-18 months”.
·
Well as we now know, Kauona was being rather
optimistic. Nearly
four years later the parties are inching their way towards a
comprehensive political settlement.
This has been achieved through a series of meetings in:
o
NZ
– Burnham I, Burnham II, Lincoln, and Rotorua;
o
Australia
– Cairns, Townsville, Canberra; and
o
numerous
meetings in Bougainville, and increasingly in Port Moresby.
·
Over the past 4 years issues have been refined to
three key components:
o
referendum
(now agreed to by the parties – referendum to be delayed 10-15
years and to include an option for independence);
o
greater
autonomy (getting there slowly, issues about powers, guarantees
and funding still be to finalised); and
o
weapons
(again, making progress - Rotokas Record signed in early May).
·
Looking back at the meeting with Sam Kauona, a
majority of the BRA/BIG believed at that time that they had won
the war. All that
remained was for Port Moresby to give sovereignty to
Bougainville (note in particular Reuben Siara’s comments).
·
This was a simplistic view.
The island was divided by civil war.
Many were very fearful that the BRA/BIG would gain full
control of the island. For
that reason they were reluctant to see the PNGDF
go.
·
Also, Port Moresby was fearful about the possible
flow on effects of giving Bougainville autonomy or independence
– ie collapse of unitary state.
·
Against this background, it is not surprising that
negotiations have at times been frustrating.
There are important issues at stake for all concerned.
·
I would now like to talk about the role of the PMG
missions in PNG – ie the role played by Australian, NZ and
Fijian High Commissions in Port Moresby in the peace process.
·
There are two points worth making:
o
First,
there is very close cooperation between POM missions. There are regular meeting and joint calls on Ministers and
officials. Joint
visits to Bougainville. This
is important as a means of delivering consistent messages
to both sides. (Goff/Downer
comments shortly after NZ 1999 general elections also important.
They said that “New Zealand and Australia would support to the best of
their ability the outcome of a negotiated settlement for
Bougainville freely entered into by the parties”).
o
Second,
to be effective as intermediaries we had to have the ability to
talk frankly to all sides.
Port Moresby Missions had to work hard to establish
credibility with Ministers and officials.
Being perceived as neutral in the conflict was key
to gaining trust and access.
·
So what did we talk about in meetings with
Bougainvilleans and the National Government?
·
With
Bougainvilleans –
o
Keep
negotiating – don’t walk away from the table
o
Important
that Bougainville negotiate as a single unit – maintain
‘consensus’. Leaders
had to be seen to be working together.
o
Going
for independence now, risked creating a ‘failed state’ –
lack of administration, financial capacity etc.
o
Higher
autonomy would probably meet the demands of most
Bougainvilleans, so don’t ‘draw down’ all powers at once.
o
Cannot
have a genuine peace process – free election etc. – if
weapons are still in communities.
Need disarmament plan.
o
Important
that Bougainville leaders visit Port Moresby regularly and meet
national politicians who will have to vote on constitutional
amendments in favour of Bougainville.
·
With
Waigani –
o
Bougainville
is not just another troublesome province – unique problems
require unique solutions
o
Encourage
ministers and officials to think more expansively about autonomy
and the referendum issue. Not
automatically the end of the unitary state.
o
Critical
that PNG deliver goods/services to Bougainville – if not they
will lose what support they have on the island.
o
Important
to strengthen Waigani’s negotiating team to match the strength
of the Bougainville team.
·
Have
efforts of the region - PMG countries - made a difference?
o
Yes
– PMG provides “reassurance” enabling Bougainvilleans to
reconcile. PMG and
POM missions also the “eyes” of the region.
This has helped keep all sides “honest”.
o
ODA
programs. Peace
facilitation, travel, meetings, re-establishment of basic
services, roads for economic development.
‘Peace dividend’.
Paid for key advisers – ie Regan.
o
Role
of Port Moresby Missions;
§
challenged Bougainville and National Government to
think about issues in new/different ways
§
when asked, provided compromise language – ie
referendum. Moi
Avei (Bougainville Minister) keen to see Australia and New
Zealand involved in this way.
§
alerted capitals when policy intervention might be
required - ie further meetings of the parties, Ministerial phone
calls or letters, etc.
o
UNOMB.
Not mentioned previously, but plays an important role;
chairing meetings. Also
involved in developing arms control/disposal mechanisms.
·
Finally, a brief comment about the broader
implications of the Bougainville crisis for PNG.
o
never
met anyone in PNG who thought existing provincial arrangements
were working satisfactorily.
There is now some debate taking place in the media, and
among some Ministers, academics and senior officials, about
alternative ways to govern PNG.
o
in
this context a progressive settlement on Bougainville could
provide a useful model of how PNG might be governed more
effectively.
o important, therefore, to get the political settlement in Bougainville right.
Thank You