Next INDONESIA STUDY GROUP Meeting November 20, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Indonesia Study Group , add a commentMeetings are held from 12.30 to 2.00 pm in Seminar Room B, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, ANU (unless otherwise specified).
26 November
Ken Setiawan (Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden University)
The Relevance of the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM)
When in 1993 the Indonesian government announced the establishment of Komnas HAM, it was met with scepticism and even hostility. However, in a short period the Commission became one of the most trusted state institutions. In more recent years, the legitimacy of the Commission has rapidly deteriorated, despite democratic developments and more popular and institutional support for human rights.
This seminar will discuss the development of Komnas HAM in its socio-political context, discuss the factors influencing its performance and what it has and may be able to contribute to the promotion, protection and implementation of human rights in Indonesia.
The committee welcomes suggestions for seminar speakers and topics.
Please contact any of us:
COMMITTEE FOR 2008:
Ed Aspinall x 55915; Greg Fealy x 52302; John McCarthy x50494; Chris Manning x 53885; Ditya Nurdianto x56215, Marcus Mietzner x57241
If you would like to be added to the ISG mailing list, please send your contact details, including your email address, to indonesia.project@anu.edu.au
Working with Government Agencies in Indonesia November 16, 2008
Posted by Peter McCawley in : News from the Indonesia Project , add a commentLinks between the Indonesian government and the ANU are strong. Every year there are many exchange visits between Indonesian government agencies and the University. The latest area of cooperation involving the Crawford School and the Indonesia Project involved a four-week capacity-building program for 12 executive staff from the Menko Perekonomian (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs) in Jakarta which concluded on 14 November.
The capacity-building program for the Menko Perekonomian staff, supported by a grant from AusAID, focused on the theme of ‘Coordination in Government.’ In speaking to the group, former Australian Primary Industries Minister John Kerin noted that ‘policy co-ordination is the most difficult job in government’. The range of lectures and meetings, therefore, was designed to cover a wide range of coordination issues.
In addition to meeting Her Excellency the Governor-General, Ms Quentin Bryce, the Menko Perekonomian group met many senior public servants at the federal and state level. Numerous ANU and other university staff, including from the Crawford School and the Indonesia Project, prepared presentations for the group on many aspects of coordination of government functions in Australia and Asia.
In effect, the Menko Perekonomian group spent much time discussing a wide range of aspects of government management, both in Australia and in Indonesia. In comparison with the situation in many other countries, standards of government management in Australia in recent years have been relatively high. Key reforms to public sector management in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia led to markedly improved performance of public sector agencies. Management mechanisms such as the establishment of transparent and measurable Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) increased pressure on Australian public sector managers to meet agreed goals.
There are plans for a second executive team from the Menko Perekonomian to visit ANU next year.
Review of Governance Issues November 13, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : News from the Indonesia Project , add a commentRoss McLeod made a presentation to a group of senior officials from the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs on 12 November 2008. The team was nearing the end of a four week visit to Australia on a program intended to provide capacity-building activities in the overall coordination of economic policies and programs in Indonesia. This program was under the direction of Dr Peter McCawley.
The presentation provided a broad review of governance issues. To see it, click here.
Next INDONESIA STUDY GROUP Meeting November 12, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Indonesia Study Group , add a commentMeetings are held from 12.30 to 2.00 pm in Seminar Room B, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, ANU (unless otherwise specified).
13 November (N.B. This seminar has unusual circumstances it will be held on a Thursday but in usual venue of Seminar Room B at 12:30-2:00pm
Leo Sudaryono (Asia Foundation, Jakarta)
Prison Reform in Indonesia: Challenges and Opportunities
Since the fall of Soeharto, rule of law has been a core commitment for democratic reformers in Indonesia. Domestic and foreign agencies alike have spearheaded numerous efforts to reform the Indonesian justice sector, through media campaigns, public monitoring programs, and full-scale direct technical assistance to law enforcement agencies. While problems still exist in these institutions, some changes have begun to take place. Police, prosecutors, and judges are now more effective in enforcing laws and bringing perpetrators to justice. This increased effectiveness, ironically, has given rise to a new set of problems. While the number of criminals convicted has increased dramatically by over 85% over the past four years, from 71,587 to 127,000, prison capacity has increased by less than .03%. Over the past year, chronic problems in the prison system have received increasing media attention, with special focus on problems such as the high HIV-related mortality rate amongst inmates, acute overcrowding, the high number of pre-trial detainees held in prisons, drug circulation, unclear and inconsistent implementation of remission awards, the suspicious escape of certain prisoners, and the worryingly high number of recidivist criminals. Pervasive corruption in Indonesian prisons has only compounded these problems.
How should Indonesia address with these interlocking complexities? In the context of chronic poverty and acutely high unemployment rate, what priorities government should provide in fulfilling the rights of detainees?
The committee welcomes suggestions for seminar speakers and topics.
Please contact any of us:
COMMITTEE FOR 2008:
Ed Aspinall x 55915; Greg Fealy x 52302; John McCarthy x50494; Chris Manning x 53885; Ditya Nurdianto x56215, Marcus Mietzner x57241
If you would like to be added to the ISG mailing list, please send your contact details, including your email address, to indonesia.project@anu.edu.au
What’s New in the Latest Issue of BIES? November 7, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : News from the Indonesia Project , add a commentThe December 2008 issue of the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies is now available online. Here’s a summary of the contents:
As was the case exactly 11 years ago, the ‘Survey of recent developments’ in this issue, contributed by Vincent Ashcroft and David Cavanough, was being finalised just at the time that Indonesia appeared to be moving unexpectedly and rapidly in the direction of a financial crisis. The second-quarter national income accounts showed continuing strong economic growth. The budget deficit was well under control. Inflation was a good deal higher than in the run-up to the previous major crisis, but the exchange rate had been steady for an extended period, notwithstanding the emergence of a small current account deficit in the second quarter. There had been a significant downturn in share prices, but this had not been regarded as of major concern. It was not until September and October that the foreign exchange and capital markets began to be significantly disturbed by the sudden and severe global financial upheaval.
Prior to this, the major economic event was the announcement in mid-August of the 2009 budget. The original plan was for this to follow similar lines to that of 2008, but at the last moment the government decided to undertake significant modifications. The first was to reduce substantially the assumed average world oil price for the fiscal year in view of the rapid decline that began in July. The second was in response to a finding by the Constitutional Court that previous years’ budgets had infringed the Constitution by failing to allocate at least 20%of spending to education; accordingly, it was decided to implement a dramatic doubling of education spending. The government decided to modify the 2009 budget even further in October, after the stock market deteriorated so rapidly that the authorities felt obliged to close the stock exchange for three days. Details were sketchy at the time the survey was completed, and their fiscal impact has not been analysed here. Plans were also introduced hurriedly to boost liquidity and to guarantee the safety of bank deposits, in a bid to calm the markets and stave off any significant downturn in the real economy. The survey also discusses poverty, electricity supply problems, and the changing nature of Indonesia’s relationship with aid donors.
Gerry van Klinken contributes this year’s discussion of recent political events, based on his Indonesia Update conference presentation at the Australian National University in September. He draws attention to the ‘ambiguities of democratic change’. On the negative side of the ledger, he perceives in some groups an apparentyearning for the centralised power and even the capacity for repressive intolerance of the Soeharto era. A first example was that of two closely run gubernatorial elections, in which the outcomes were so strongly contested that eventually they had to be decided in Jakarta. A second example was the violent persecution of the Ahmadiyah sect by hardline traditionalist Islamic groups, culminating in a ’semi-ban’ of the movement—an outcome interpreted as showing that democracy can create spaces for groups that are fundamentally anti-democratic. On the other hand, the author reports progress on the human rights front, and highlights the extraordinarily vigorous campaign of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). A senior intelligence officer alleged to have been responsible for the 2004 murder of human rights activist Munir has been brought to trial, although some witnesses have withdrawn their earlier testimony. Meanwhile, KPK has been so successful in its campaign to bring corrupt officials—including parlia-mentarians—to justice that it now risks a backlash and possible emasculation at the hands of those whose interests it threatens.
This issue of BIES includes the latest in our series of papers on relatively recent economic legislation. Howard Dick analyses the 2008 shipping law, within a historical context that highlights the ongoing general conflict in government between protectionism and development. He argues that the restoration of democracy since 1998 has been accompanied by a revival of economic nationalism. Whereas in the 1980s the government deregulated the highly protected and inefficient shipping industry to facilitate a non-oil export drive, since 1999 there has been a gradual process of re-regulation, which has restored some of the old protectionist devices. This is likely to frustrate attempts to improve logistics and facilitate trade, notwithstanding a mild liberalisation of state control over the ports sector.
Hal Hill, Budy Resosudarmo and Yogi Vidyattama examine provincial data on economic growth, inequality, convergence, structural change and social indicators over the last three decades. Their analysis shows that although there continues to be great diversity in economic and social outcomes, growth and social progress have been remarkably even throughout Indonesia. Surprisingly, perhaps, the poorest regions, located mainly in Eastern Indonesia, have generally performed about as well as the national average. The top performing provinces have been quite diverse, and the list has changed significantly over time. For example, in terms of per capita non-mining GRP growth, none of the top six performers in the first sub-period studied (1976-90) was still in the top six in the second (1991-2004). For the period as a whole, the three provinces best ‘connected’ to the global economy performed very well, although the other three of the top six performed just as well collectively.
We also present here a new set of 11 abstracts of recently completed PhD dissertations on the Indonesian economy and closely related fields. The number of such abstracts has increased steadily each year since the inception of this series in December 2003. Commencing in 2009, we will include new abstracts in each issue of the journal.
The book review section in this issue covers a study of regional bureaucracies and their efforts to reform and promote competitiveness; an analysis of small and medium enterprise wood furniture manufacturing clusters in Central Java; an edited collection of regional case studies on women and work in Indonesia; a book analysing the motives for and circumstances surrounding Eastern Indonesian women’s travel from their place of origin; and a study of sharia and constitutionalism that argues that the two can co-exist in Indonesia.
The Herd Instinct November 3, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Essays and Comments , 1 comment so farUnbelievers in capitalism and markets have been quick to pour scorn on both as the global financial crisis rapidly worsens, often focusing on the tendency of the private sector to operate according to herd instinct. If there are signs of a possible collapse in asset prices—whether this refers to shares, real estate, or foreign exchange—then as soon as a few investors start to run, everybody runs, and chaos ensues.
In the present episode, however, it seems to me that the herd instinct has taken over the government sector—specifically, central banks, treasuries and ministries of finance, prime ministers and presidents. Listening to the barrage of self-justification of the policies of these institutions and individuals around the world one cannot help but be struck by the uniformity of it all. Everybody is doing the same thing, for the same reason. They are following the herd, taking comfort in the fact that they are not alone. How could their policies be wrong, when every country seems to be following those same policies? But I guess that’s just what happened in the early months of the Great Depression.
In Indonesia and Australia it is striking that even though both economies had been performing quite well in recent times, both countries’ governments have felt obliged to step in with massive and highly distorting policy interventions in anticipation of the calamity they believe is just around the corner. This is not sound policy. On the contrary: it seems almost inevitably to convince people a crisis is about to unfold, when in fact there need not be one. And the natural instinct of the private sector then is to pull back from new spending, which precipitates the very outcome we all seek to avoid.
In relation to monetary policy, both countries had been firmly wedded for some time to the policy of announcing and sticking to their policy rates of interest. In Australia’s case, the central bank has recently implemented a huge 1% cut in its policy rate, and it seems to be signalling that further cuts are soon to follow. In Indonesia, the central bank has not changed its policy rate, but has nevertheless taken steps to increase liquidity significantly (as though liquidity were unrelated to interest rates). Why?
If liquidity is about to dry up, as feared by both central banks, interest rates will immediately begin to rise. That would be the appropriate time to take action: not by changing the interest rate, but by supporting it at the previously announced target level. What this would mean in practice is that the authorities would need to cut back on issuing securities such as SBIs (Bank Indonesia Certificates) and government bonds. There is no need to change policy, only to persevere with the policy already announced. Maintaining liquidity in the face of a shock to the system is one thing; flooding it with extra liquidity is quite another.
It seems that governments are choosing policies on the basis of what they perceive the markets want them to do: the markets need to be pacified. Unfortunately, however, there is ample evidence from past experience to suggest that governments have very little ability to keep markets happy. Thus the boisterously positive initial responses from the markets when these big policy changes have been announced have been dramatically reversed on the very next day. Playing to the markets, rather than getting the fundamentals right, is a fool’s errand.
The markets in Indonesia are now beginning to behave as though they think the authorities have lost the plot. Inflation is high, share prices are falling, and exchange rates are depreciating—just what we would expect to see when monetary policy is significantly loosened. And all of this is driven by wishful thinking: the notion that people and firms can be persuaded to maintain or resume their spending simply by making money cheaper. It doesn’t work that way. Unless they can be persuaded that the future is actually bright, they will simply take the extra funds injected to the system and use them for speculation—not on newly produced capital goods, but on financial assets such as foreign securities, and safe commodities such as precious metals.
What level for the rupiah? October 26, 2008
Posted by Peter McCawley in : Essays and Comments , 1 comment so farThe rupiah has been drifting downwards in recent days and even dipped below the 10,000 level (against the USD) on Friday 25 October. Is this a problem?
Some observers suggest that there are good arguments for action by Indonesian monetary authorities to try to hold the rupiah below the 10,000 level. The arguments in favour of this approach are that, first, confidence is a fragile thing in financial markets everywhere at present so policies need to be directed at bolstering confidence, and second, that the 10,000 mark is an important psychological level in Indonesia right now which needs to be defended if possible.
But there are strong arguments against this “hold the line” approach. For one thing, as Bank Indonesia Governor pointed out on Friday, a weakening of the rupiah is to be expected. “What is so special about the rupiah at 10,000?”, Governor Boediono said. “We should not see it only against the dollar but against other currencies. Other currencies are also lower against the dollar.”
For another thing, there are good economic arguments for allowing the rupiah to weaken at present. A decision to try to prevent the rupiah from moving below the 10,000 mark would amount to trying to maintain a de facto rupiah peg to the US dollar. It hardly seems sensible for the rupiah to be pegged to the US dollar at any time, and especially right now.
In Australia, the $A has fluctuated widely in recent months. These large fluctuations have been helpful in managing the Australian economy. The flexibility means that part of the economic adjustment needed in Australia at present has been quickly provided by the change in the foreign exchange rate. And it would surely be helpful in Indonesia as well if the rupiah were allowed to move relatively freely – including to levels significantly below 10,000 if that is seen as appropriate.
Funding Education October 23, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Essays and Comments , 1 comment so farIn a previous posting I reported on a finding by the Constitutional Court that the government’s budget for 2008 (as well as previous budgets) infringed a recent amendment of the Constitution by failing to allocate at least 20% of government spending to the education sector. I also suggested that current and future governments would continue to ignore the 20% minimum because of reluctance to cut back on other spending priorities.
Much to my surprise, within just a few days the SBY government brought down its budget for 2009, having revised it at the last minute following the court’s decision so as to increase education spending to about 20% of the total. What an astonishing policy shift! Education was already the largest functional expense in the budget (excluding subsidies), and now it was intended virtually to double its allocation. In rough terms, the annual rate of spending on education was to increase from about $6 billion to about $12 billion, starting in less than five months time.
It would appear that as yet neither the public nor the government has any idea how this extra money is to be spent. How should it be allocated among primary, secondary and tertiary education? How should it be divided between current and capital expenditure? To what extent should additional funding be spent on back office bureaucrats or front line teachers? Should the extra funding be used entirely in public sector education, or should some of it be used to support private sector schools and universities? Should the emphasis be on raising the quantity of educational output or on raising its quality?
Such questions are extremely important, but it is highly doubtful that the government has even considered them in any depth, let alone making decisions about them. It almost beggars belief, therefore, that a financial commitment of this nature and magnitude could be made within a matter of days. This is certainly not a good example of how the policy making process should work. It is a recipe for disaster.
The constitutional amendment on education, like most laws in Indonesia, leaves a great deal to be desired in terms of clarity and precision. It is distressingly vague on key points. For example, every citizen is afforded the right to obtain an education, but what does this mean? Primary education? Lower secondary? Upper secondary? Tertiary? Each ‘citizen’ is obliged to participate in primary education. But for how many years? And what are the consequences for each such citizen—i.e. child—who does not do so? The government is obliged to finance primary education. But what if a child’s parents choose to send it to a private school? Are the costs to be covered, in part or in whole, by the government? How would this work out if rich parents sent their children to very expensive private schools? Could they sue the government if it failed to cover their costs?
In the present context the 20% minimum budget spending rule is of key importance. This requirement is worded ambiguously, such that it can be interpreted to mean either that governments at all levels must individually devote at least 20% of their budgets to education, or that total education spending by all governments in aggregate should be at least 20% of aggregate government spending. The court has adopted the latter interpretation, and the central government has accepted this. And yet education is one of the functions that has been devolved to regional governments since the beginning of 2001, so it makes little sense to require the central government to devote such a large proportion of its budget to this field. This suggests that the former interpretation is more appropriate. The logical implication is that regional governments should spend considerably more than 20% of their budgets on this aspect of their fiscal responsibilities, and the central government considerably less.
This highlights another drafting deficiency in the constitutional amendment. If the financing stipulation is interpreted as suggested here, meeting the 20% minimum becomes the joint responsibility of the central government, more than 30 provincial governments, and hundreds of local governments. In turn, it then becomes impossible to say who is to blame if the 20% level is not achieved. In other words, the finding of the Constitutional Court appears incorrect on this interpretation. Its decision should have been based on total education spending by all governments, not on that by the central government alone. And if it had found on that basis that education spending was insufficient, the blame should not have been laid solely on the central government, but on all governments collectively. Obviously, such a decision would have been pointless, because there would have been no legal basis for any instruction as to how the infringement should be rectified. An alternative, more sensible, decision would have been to send the constitutional amendment back to the parliament, with an instruction to resolve the ambiguity.
The whole episode reflects poorly on all parties involved. The parliament has recklessly amended the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has failed to recognise the deficiencies of the amendment, failed to focus on the appropriate evidence, and wrongly blamed the central government alone (on the basis of this inappropriate evidence) for supposedly infringing the Constitution. And the central government has meekly accepted this outcome, and responded in the worst possible manner.
Indonesia’s education system is certainly greatly in need of improvement, but this is not the right way to go about it.
Monetary Policy Running off the Rails October 16, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Essays and Comments , 3commentsAlong with the monetary authorities in many other countries, Bank Indonesia and the government are now acting to increase liquidity in the Indonesian economy, in the hope that this will protect against the possibility of a recession.
It would be possible to increase liquidity simply by reducing the quantity of SBIs (central bank certificates) outstanding. Although BI signalled this as a possibility last week (i.e. increasing liquidity through open market operations), more recently it has announced an alternative policy of reducing the minimum reserve requirement, which determines the amount of funds the commercial banks need to place at the central bank. Until now, calculation of minimum reserves has been absurdly complex, depending on both the size of the bank (four different categories) and its loan to deposit ratio (LDR) (six different categories). Theoretically, the ratio of reserves to deposits could be anywhere in the range 5 to 13%. The average level is currently about 9.1%, and BI has announced that the new reserve ratio will be a flat 7.5%, with no adjustment for bank size or LDRs.
The simplification of the reserve requirement is to be welcomed. But the impact of this on liquidity is likely to be counter-productive. The change will have the effect of freeing up almost Rp 23 trillion, the effect of which in turn is equivalent to increasing the supply of base money (M0) by about 6.6%. But base money has already been growing far too rapidly to be consistent with the current target level of about 5% inflation, which has risen from about 6% in the middle of 2007 to more than 12% in September this year. The new policy is therefore a worrying development. It seems almost certain to generate even higher inflation and more rapid depreciation of the currency. At the same time, the ability of this policy to prevent the emergence of recession is by no means obvious.
Almost everybody who talks about this issue focuses only on the demand side, forgetting about supply. With increased liquidity, individuals and firms have a greater capacity to spend. But firms also have a greater capacity to withhold goods and services from the market in anticipation of being able to push up their prices. If supply curves move upward at about the same rates as demand curves, the result is higher prices with no change in output. The experience of 1998, when inflation surged to over 80% at the same time that output was falling by 13%, provides clear evidence of the wishful thinking that underlies the push for increased liquidity in current circumstances.
Senior deputy governor of BI, Miranda Goeltom, is well aware of the problem, and has announced that BI does not intend to decrease its policy interest rate, which has only recently been increased to 9.5%. But there is an air of unreality about this. How could nominal interest rates possibly be maintained at current levels with liquidity being increased so significantly? Liquidity and interest rates are directly linked. Indeed, if BI were to choose to reduce interest rates, it is precisely by increasing liquidity that this would be achieved. It would simply reduce the quantity of SBIs it issues relative to the quantity maturing, which means that it would be paying out more on maturing SBIs than it would be receiving for issuing new ones.
With liquidity suddenly increasing by a large amount as a result of the change in reserve requirements, the demand for SBIs at current interest rates will increase. If BI issues enough to satisfy this demand, liquidity will return to roughly what it had been previously. If it does not satisfy this demand, it will either need to allow SBI rates to fall, or it will have to ration the demand for SBIs at the auction. In this latter case, a wedge will be driven between money market rates and the official rate, which will only serve to demonstrate that the policy rate no longer bears any relevance to what is going on in the market. BI will be able to pretend that it is still fighting inflation, but the reality is that by adding to system liquidity so significantly, it is encouraging inflation to accelerate even further.
In the near future, expect inflation to accelerate and money market interest rates to decline. But don’t bet on Indonesia avoiding an economic downturn.
Cribb on Managing the Archipelagic State: Scoop Preview! September 18, 2008
Posted by Ross McLeod in : Essays and Comments , 1 comment so farThe following is the draft text of the opening address by Robert Cribb, organiser of this year’s Indonesia Update Conference, which gets underway at 9am on Friday 19th September.
This conference focuses on the special problems of governance that arise in an archipelagic state. One clear lesson of history is that failing to govern the sea is dangerous. An ungoverned sea can be a highway for enemies, or at least for people with malicious intentions. Badly managed, it becomes a barrier between the 17500 islands of Indonesia. Managed well, on the other hand, it can be a highway linking those islands, an essential element in the economic division of labour in Indonesia which helps to create economies of scale that match Indonesia’s size. It can be a key element in the national economy as a source of resources, such as fish and minerals that not only provide a living to those who harvest them but also bring broader benefits to the economy and to society. It can be a source of hazards such as pollution, tsunami and storms, and we are just beginning to understand the role that it may play in climate change. And we should not forget that the sea is also a deep part of the Indonesian sense of identity, as reflected in one of the most evocative Indonesian terms for homeland, tanah air, land and water.
And yet despite the importance of the sea, governing the maritime world is an immensely difficult task. The task is difficult for the simple reason that the sea is fluid. It is often impossible and always difficult to mark out any clear border at sea or to maintain or fortify any fixed point. And the sea is dangerous. There is hardly anywhere on land where the possibility of death is as close and as constant as it is on the sea.
The fluidity and dangerousness of the sea means that it rewards technology and skill in a way that has few parallels on land. Throughout history, we find that technological advances at sea have driven major social and political changes on land. Advances in ship-building technology, improvements in the technology of locating and capturing fish or minerals under the sea, developments in mapping and navigation, and refinements in the legal regime covering the seas have all been instrumental in major historical transformations. The implications of these changes have spread well beyond the maritime zone.
For the reasons I have mentioned, the sheer presence of government that is so much a fact of life on land is vastly weaker on the surface of the ocean and almost non-existent underneath the waves. In the last few decades, however, there have been dramatic advances in the technology needed for accessing the seas safely, dramatic advances in our understanding of the complex physical and biological systems within the sea and of their influence on the land, and also dramatic advances in our creativeness in devising rules and laws that reflect the current state of both technology and scientific knowledge.
The sea is the great frontier of the twenty-first century. Indonesia not only controls an important part of that frontier, but it has also retained skills of seamanship that comes from long experience with the sea and that will remain crucial in making the most of that maritime frontier in the long term.
In this conference we will hear papers, both current and historical, that set out the strategies that Indonesian governments have followed to overcome the basic ungovernability of the sea. We have papers on new and old maritime regimes, on marine security and marine safety, on people whose lives are intertwined with the sea, on the economic implications of the management of maritime trade, and on the challenges of environmental management at sea.